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MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE,
PROHIBITED EXPERIMENTAL THERAPIES, AND 
PAYMENT FOR ORGANS 
Eugene Volokh*
I. INTRODUCTION 
Three sisters lie in adjoining hospital rooms.  A fourth lives a block 
away.  All are in deadly peril. 
Alice is seven months pregnant, and the pregnancy threatens her 
life.  Her fetus has long been viable, so she no longer has the Roe/Casey 
right to abortion on demand.  But because her life is in jeopardy, she 
has a constitutional right to save her life by hiring a doctor to perform a 
post-viability abortion, though it means the death of a viable fetus.  She 
would even have such a right if the pregnancy were only posing a seri-
ous threat to her health, rather than threatening her life.1
Katherine lives next door to the hospital.  A person comes into her 
home and seems to be about to try to kill her (or perhaps to seriously in-
jure, rape, or kidnap her).  Katherine may protect her life by killing the 
invader, even if the invader isn’t morally culpable, for instance if he’s 
insane or if he mistakenly believes that he’s the one defending himself.2
Just as Alice may protect herself by killing an innocent fetus who is 
threatening her life, so Katherine may protect herself by killing even a 
morally innocent attacker who is threatening her life.  And Katherine 
has a right to self-defense even though recognizing this right increases 
the chance that some people can use false claims of self-defense to get 
away with killing the innocent.3
Ellen, back in the hospital, is terminally ill.  No proven therapies of-
fer help.  An experimental therapy seems relatively safe, because it has 
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1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973); Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 
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passed Phase I FDA testing, yet federal law bars its use outside clinical 
trials because it hasn’t been demonstrated to be effective (and further 
checked for safety) through Phase II testing.  Nonetheless, under the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Develop-
mental Drugs v. Eschenbach,4 Ellen has a constitutional right to try to 
save her life by hiring a doctor to administer the therapy. 
Olivia is dying of kidney failure in the room next to Alice’s and 
Ellen’s.  A kidney transplant would likely save her life, just as an abor-
tion would save Alice’s, lethal self-defense may save Katherine’s, and an 
experimental treatment may save Ellen’s. 
But the federal ban on payment for organs sharply limits the num-
ber of available matching kidneys, and Olivia will likely die if she must 
wait for a donated kidney.  Barring compensation for goods or services 
makes them scarce, and denies many people access to them.  Alice and 
Ellen would be in jeopardy if doctors were only allowed to perform abor-
tions or experimental treatments without compensation.  Katherine 
wouldn’t be able to defend herself with a gun or knife if such weapons 
could only be donated and not sold.  If organ providers, or the heirs of 
posthumous providers, could be compensated for the organs, many more 
such organs would be available, and Olivia would be much likelier to get 
the life-saving kidney.  But federal law bans organ sales, and thus frus-
trates her ability to protect her life. 
My claim is that all four cases involve the exercise of a person’s pre-
sumptive right to self-defense—lethal self-defense in Katherine’s case, 
and what I call medical self-defense in the others.5
Such a right may be constitutionally founded:  Given that Alice has 
such a right to defend herself by getting an abortion,6 Ellen and Olivia 
 
4 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en 
banc pending.
5 The most distinguishable case here is Katherine’s, though I hope it is still persua-
sive—for reasons given in Part III—to those who are more moved by claims of a right to 
use lethal self-defense than by claims of medical autonomy.  But even if Katherine’s case 
is set aside, the other three cases remain analogous. 
Some might characterize protection against a life-threatening pregnancy, an animal 
attack, or an attack by an insane person, as “necessity” rather than “self-defense,” reserv-
ing “self-defense” for defense against someone who is morally culpable.  See, e.g., Boaz 
Sangero, A New Defense for Self-Defense, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 475, 511-21 (2006) (sug-
gesting this as to the use of lethal force against an insane attacker).  Not much logically 
turns on such a label, but I prefer “self-defense” because it’s a common lay term for the 
conduct—people, for instance, would readily say “I had to kill that rattlesnake in self-
defense” (see cases cited infra note 41 for examples) though no-one would see the rattle-
snake as morally culpable.  Moreover, the self-defense defense is recognized in all states, 
just as abortion-as-self-defense is a nationwide constitutional norm, and just as lethal 
force may be used throughout the country to protect one’s life against an animal or an in-
sane person.  The necessity defense, on the other hand, is recognized only in about half the 
states, see infra note 52. 
6 Abortion-as-self-defense may involve very different emotions in the defender (likely 
deep sorrow) than lethal self-defense usually would (justifiable rage, as well as the acute 
fear that imminent attack causes).  See Nicholas Johnson, Principles and Passions: The 
Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 97, 111 (1997) (making this 
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should have the same right to defend themselves by getting other medi-
cal procedures.  Alice is entitled to have surgery in which a doctor in-
serts surgical devices into her body to excise a fetus that, tragically, is 
threatening her life.  Ellen should therefore likewise be entitled to have 
a procedure in which a doctor inserts chemicals into her body in order to 
destroy (say) a tumor that is threatening her life.7 And Olivia should 
similarly be entitled to have a procedure in which a doctor inserts a re-
placement organ into her body in order to replace an organ the failure of 
which is threatening her life.  It can’t be that a woman is constitution-
ally entitled to protect her own life, but only when doing so kills a viable 
fetus. 
And in any event, such a presumptive right should be recognized as 
a moral matter.  Even if the Supreme Court stops recognizing unenu-
merated constitutional rights, legislatures should presumptively protect 
people’s medical self-defense rights just as they protect people’s lethal 
self-defense rights, and just as public opinion overwhelmingly supports 
women’s abortion-as-self-defense rights.8 While a legislature need not 
fund the exercise of people’s self-defense, it generally ought not enact 
laws that substantially burden people’s ability to protect their lives. 
I will also argue that, while this presumption is potentially rebut-
table, it should take a great deal to rebut it.  Recognizing the right to 
medical self-defense as a constitutional right, or as a strong moral right, 
means that the government should have a very good reason to substan-
tially burden the right, and that the restriction should be as narrow as 
possible. 
In particular, while the right may be regulated in some ways—for 
instance, to prevent the killing of people by organ robbers—such regula-
tions can and should be far less burdensome than a total ban on organ 
sales would be.  We respect and value self-defense rights enough that 
we allow lethal self-defense, even given the risk that false claims of self-
defense can be used as a cloak for murder:  Rather than prophylactically 
banning all use of lethal force, we make certain uses illegal and rely on 
case-by-case decisionmaking to discover these improper uses and to de-
ter them.  The same should apply to payments for organ transplants. 
 
point).  Nonetheless, the moral principle at the heart of both is similar—it is the right to 
defend one’s life against those who threaten it, whether the threat is wrongful or innocent.  
To see this, consider a case of self-defense against an acquaintance who is attacking you 
under what you know to be an insane delusion, or against a beloved pet that you suspect 
is rabid.  See generally infra Part III.A.  The emotions in these cases may be complex, and 
may often involve sorrow more than wrath.  But the moral entitlement to engage in self-
defense is present notwithstanding that. 
7 That Ellen’s surgery is riskier, because less proven, than Alice’s might be relevant if 
Ellen had other reliable alternatives.  But if Ellen is terminally ill, the state’s interest in 
protecting her short remaining lifespan against her own bad decision should be no weight-
ier than the state’s interest in protecting the fetus’s long remaining lifespan against Al-
ice’s decision.  See infra p. 2. 
8 See infra p. 22. 
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I will begin in Part II by discussing in more detail the existing right 
to medical self-defense.  I’ll argue that Roe and Casey have to be under-
stood as securing not just a pre-viability right to abortion as reproduc-
tive choice, but also a post-viability right to abortion as medical self-
defense when a woman’s life is threatened by her pregnancy.  And if you 
support this right, I’ll argue, you should also support a similar medical 
self-defense right for people whose lives are threatened by other medical 
conditions. 
I will go on in Part III to discuss the right to lethal self-defense: the 
right to protect your life against attack even if it means killing the at-
tacker.  This right has long been recognized by American law.  I will ar-
gue that it has constitutional foundations, in substantive due process, in 
state constitutional rights to defend life, in state constitutional rights to 
bear arms, and possibly in the Second Amendment.9
But even if the right to lethal self-defense is simply a common-law 
and statutory right rather than a constitutional right, our recognition of 
it should counsel in favor of recognizing a similar common-law and 
statutory right to defend one’s life against medical threats as well as 
against human threats.  If you support people’s right to lethal self-
defense—and especially, though not only, if you support law-abiding 
citizens’ right to carry guns in self-defense—you should also support 
their right to medical self-defense.  My hope is that this may help per-
suade those (largely conservative) readers who are otherwise skeptical 
about the more traditionally liberal abortion rights analogy. 
In Part IV, I’ll argue that the right of medical self-defense offers an 
extra foundation—one the court didn’t even mention—for the Abigail 
Alliance holding that there is indeed a constitutional right to use ex-
perimental therapies to protect one’s life.  And in Part V, I’ll argue that 
the right makes the ban on organ sales presumptively improper and 
presumptively unconstitutional, when the organs are needed to protect 
people’s lives.  In the process, I’ll analyze various anti-organ-market ar-
guments, and explain why these at most justify regulations of the mar-
ket, rather than total prohibitions. 
Finally, in Part VI, I’ll briefly touch on whether such a right to 
medical self-defense, even if logically supportable, is likely to be politi-
cally plausible.  I think it can be and should be, both in the political 
process and in the judicial. 
First, I hope that the political case for medical self-defense will be 
strengthened by connecting it both to abortion rights (which are broadly 
 
9 The right to bear arms has historically been justified as a check on government au-
thority, not just as a tool for self-defense against criminals, see, e.g., 1 ST. GEORGE 
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 143 (1803); 2 id. app. 300; JOSEPH STORY, A FA-
MILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264-65 (1840).  But most 
state constitutional rights to bear arms also cover individual self-defense, see infra note 2, 
and most modern defenders of Second Amendment rights care about individual self-
defense at least as much about the broader social justifications for gun ownership. 
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supported by most liberals, and supported by nearly everyone, including 
most conservatives, when a woman’s life is in danger), and to lethal self-
defense rights (which are broadly supported by most conservatives, and 
supported in considerable measure by the majority of Americans, in-
cluding many liberals). 
Second, I think there’s reason for hope even in constitutional litiga-
tion.  Despite the Justices’—especially the conservative Justices’—
stated hesitance about recognizing unenumerated constitutional rights, 
Justice Kennedy provided the swing vote for recognizing an unenumer-
ated right to sexual autonomy.10 Justice O’Connor suggested support 
for recognizing an unenumerated right for the terminally ill to receive 
pain-killing medication even when that medication hastens death.11 
The second vote in the Abigail Alliance case came from Judge Doug-
las Ginsburg, who had been nominated to the Supreme Court by Presi-
dent Reagan.  The case itself was brought by the Abigail Alliance joined 
by a prominent conservative public interest firm, the Washington Legal 
Foundation.  Even then-Justice Rehnquist in Roe v. Wade suggested 
that it would be unconstitutional to ban abortion when the abortion was 
needed to save the mother’s life.12 The battle for recognizing a constitu-
tional right to medical self-defense, especially as to organ transplant 
markets, may be uphill.  But it’s not hopeless, and it’s worth fighting. 
II. THE RIGHT TO MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE: ROE AND CASEY 
A. The Presumptive Right To Be Free of Government Interference With 
Your Medical Attempts To Protect Your Life 
Roe and Casey hold that the Constitution protects the right to an 
abortion, but this right actually consists of two different rights—
different in scope, justification, and popular support. 
The first, highly controversial, right is the right to abortion as re-
productive choice:  Under this right, the woman may get an abortion on 
demand before viability, simply by choosing not to bear the child. 
The government may regulate the exercise of the right, such as by 
requiring a waiting period, or by requiring doctors to say certain things 
about the abortion to the woman.13 But such regulations are constitu-
tional only if they don’t create a substantial obstacle to the woman’s 
right to choose an abortion.14 Any attempts to broadly prohibit abor-
tions before viability are, given Roe and Casey, unconstitutional. 
The second right is the right to abortion after viability but only 
when necessary “to preserve the life or health of the mother.”15 This is 
 
10 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
11 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
12 See infra note 17. 
13 Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
14 Id. at 877. 
15 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
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not the right to abortion on demand, since a woman must show a par-
ticular reason for a post-viability abortion.  Nor is the right justified by 
the woman’s right to choose whether to bear a child:  If the dangerous 
medical condition hadn’t arisen, the woman would have been obligated 
to bear the child to term.  The time for her reproductive choice is past. 
Rather, the right is a right to medical self-defense—the right to pro-
tect your own life using medical care, even when this requires destroy-
ing that which is threatening your life.16 And this right is largely un-
controversial.  Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Roe,
wrote that “If the Texas statute were to prohibit an abortion even where 
the mother’s life is in jeopardy,” he had “little doubt” that the statute 
would be unconstitutional.17 Likewise, even during the pre-Roe era, 
when abortion was illegal throughout the country, “[t]he criminal abor-
tion laws passed in every state by 1880 made exceptions for therapeutic 
abortions performed in order to save a woman’s life.”18
Recent public opinion similarly overwhelmingly endorses the abor-
tion-as-self-defense right,19 even while abortion-on-demand remains ex-
 
16 See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 51-
53 (1971); John T. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 58 (John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970); 
Martha A. Field, Killing “the Handicapped”—Before and After Birth, 16 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 79, 95 n.53 (1993). 
The fetus usually threatens the mother’s life directly, but may sometimes also 
threaten it by interfering with treatment for a disease from which the mother is suffering.  
In both instances, though, the life-saving abortions are properly described as actions taken 
against a fetus that is threatening the woman’s life, and should thus be seen as morally 
and constitutionally identical (just as there’s no moral difference between killing an in-
sane captor who’s threatening to kill you himself, and killing an insane captor who’s keep-
ing you from being able to get life-saving treatment). 
Professor Davis has argued that abortions aimed at preventing the mother’s death 
are not justifiable under normal self-defense principles, chiefly because (1) while the fe-
tus’s existence may threaten the woman’s life, the fetus is morally innocent, unlike the 
aggressor in the typical self-defense case, and (2) even if it’s permissible for a woman to 
kill someone who’s a morally innocent threat to her, this permission doesn’t extend to 
those (like the abortion provider) who would help the woman do this.  Nancy Davis, Abor-
tion and Self-Defense, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 189-95 (1984).  Yet the law rightly allows 
self-defense generally even against nonculpable attackers (such as an attacker who is de-
lusional, or innocently mistaken, see infra note 37), tragic as the need for such self-defense 
may be; and it imposes no limitation on others’ right to help in this defense.  See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05.  Nonetheless, this disagreement doesn’t affect the core of my 
thesis in this article:  Even if the abortion-as-self-defense right gives a woman more rights 
than normal self-defense concepts would entitle her to (perhaps because it rests on the no-
tion that a fetal life, even after viability, is less valuable than a woman’s), the right still 
provides ample authority for medical self-defense using procedures other than abortion:  If 
a woman may protect her life against medical threats even by aborting a viable fetus, she 
should be at least as able to protect her life against medical threats using procedures that 
don’t involve such jeopardy to a compelling government interest. 
17 Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
18 LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME 5 (1997). 
19 I use the term “abortion-as-self-defense” to highlight the close connection between 
the overwhelmingly popular right to protect one’s life against threat from a fetus and the 
overwhelmingly publicly popular right to protect one’s life against threat from an attacker 
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tremely controversial.  In polls from the 1970s to the 2000s, only 9% to 
15% of respondents endorse the view that abortions should be banned 
even when the woman’s life is in danger.20 Compare this to the 42% to 
58% of respondents who endorse the view that abortion should be gen-
erally banned, and available at most to protect the woman’s life or in 
cases of rape or incest,21 and the 33% to 46% who endorse the view that 
abortion should be generally banned, and available at most to protect 
the woman’s life, with no mention of any exception for rape or incest.22 
Similarly, even when people are specifically asked about third-
trimester abortions, only 22% say they would ban these abortions even 
when the mother’s life is in danger.23 Compare that to the 74% of re-
spondents who say they would reject abortion on demand during the 
third trimester.24 
Moreover, this right exists even in the face of the compelling gov-
ernment interest in protecting the fetus’s life.  Roe and Casey hold that 
at viability, this interest becomes compelling, compelling enough to 
trump the abortion-as-choice right.25 But the same cases hold that this 
compelling interest does not trump the abortion-as-self-defense right:  
The woman may get an abortion to protect her life (or even her health) 
 
(even a morally innocent one, see infra text accompanying notes 39-41).  I am not referring 
to the broader (and more controversial) argument that even the Roe abortion-on-demand 
right can be justified by analogy to self-defense against serious bodily injury (on the theory 
that an unwanted pregnancy is such an injury, and that the self-defense right applies 
even if the woman helped cuase the pregnancy).  See Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. 
Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1611-18 (1979).   
20 See Opinion Dynamics, Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2006, acc. no. 1644508 (12%); Gallup Org., 
May 19-21, 2003, acc. no. 0431679 (15%); ABC News & Washington Post, Jan. 16-20, 2003, 
acc. no. 0419810 (10%); NBC News & AP, Sept. 24-25, 1979, acc. no. 0084373 (9%); Roper 
Org., Aug. 20-27, 1979, acc. no. 0115959 (12%).  All surveys listed in this footnote and the 
following ones are available on LEXIS, in the RPOLL file of the NEWS database. 
21 CBS News, Jan. 5-8, 2006, acc. no. 1639924 (55%); Princeton Survey Res. Ass. Int’l, 
Dec. 7-11, 2005, acc. no. 1638948 (42%); L.A. Times, July 17-21, 2004, acc. no. 1603030 
(51%); L.A. Times, Jan. 30-Feb. 2, 2003, acc. no. 0420087 (54%); L.A. Times, June 8-13, 
2000, acc. no. 0361573 (54%); Market Strategies, Feb. 19-25, 1998, acc. no. 0326766 (54%); 
CBS News & N.Y. Times, Apr. 13-16, 1989, acc. no. 0016255 (48%); CBS News & N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 25, 1989, acc. no. 0016257  (53%); N.Y. Times,  Dec. 14-18, 1985 (56%); CBS 
News & N.Y. Times,  Nov. 18-19, 1985, acc. no. 0020612 (47%); CBS News & N.Y. Times,  
Jan. 14-17, 1985, acc. no. 0014055 (58%); Gallup Org., Sept. 28-Oct. 1, 1984, acc. no. 
0032647 (50%). 
22 Opinion Dynamics,  Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2006, acc. no. 1644506 (35%); Harris Interact-
ive, Apr. 4-10, 2006, acc. no. 1651042 (44%); CBS News & New York Times,  Sept. 30-Oct. 
4, 1984, acc. no. 0014239 (43%); Roper Org., May 5-12, 1979, acc. no. 0118970 (46%); Roper 
Org., Aug. 20-27, 1977, acc. no. 115959 (33%); Roper Org., Feb. 27-Mar. 1, 1976, acc. no. 
0046661 (45%).  I have seen only one survey that falls outside these results, and reports 
only 23% support for this view, see Market Strategies, Feb. 19-25, 1998, acc. no. 0326766; 
but even it reports 54% support for the view that abortion-on-demand should generally be 
banned (the 31% difference between the two figures represents people who say abortion 
“[s]hould be legal only in the cases or rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother”). 
23 See Gallup Org.,  May 19-21, 2003, acc. no. 0431684. 
24 See Gallup Org.,  May 19-21, 2003, acc. no. 0431688. 
25 410 U.S. at 163; 505 U.S. at 860. 
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even when this means killing the fetus.26 Modest burdens on the right 
to abortion as self-defense, such as informed consent or waiting period 
requirements, would likely be constitutional; but substantial burdens 
would not be.27
As a doctrinal matter, the abortion-as-self-defense right has been 
recognized only as to abortion.  It’s hard to see, though, how it can be 
logically limited to that.28 The right to decide whether to bear a child, 
which is the foundation for the abortion-as-reproductive-choice right, is 
no longer in play.  After viability the time to choose has passed; the 
power to choose not to bear the fetus after viability is only a side effect 
of the woman’s right to protect her life. 
The ability to get an abortion, before or after viability, involves a 
woman’s control over her own body.  But a patient’s adding substances 
(such as medicines or a donated organ) to her body, as well as removing 
substances from her body (say, through drugs that kill cancer cells), also 
involves her control over her body.  If the addition and removal are 
aimed at the same goal as the late-term abortion—saving the woman’s 
life—there’s no reason to treat the abortion more favorably than the 
other procedures.29 
26 Naturally, the right to abortion-as-self-defense, like other self-defense rights and 
like other rights more broadly, is in some measure constrained by the rights of others who 
aren’t threatening the woman’s life.  No woman has a constitutional right to force a doctor 
to perform an abortion at gunpoint, even to save her life.  Likewise, Ellen’s constitutional 
right to medical self-defense wouldn’t entitle her to steal the experimental drugs from the 
drugmaker, if the drugmaker chooses not to sell them to her.  But this is no different from 
the way other indisputably recognized constitutional rights operate:  My Free Press 
Clause rights don’t allow me to steal a printing press, though they guarantee me broad 
freedom to publish what I wish on my lawfully owned printing press.  See infra note 53. 
27 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
28 Cf. Yvonne Cripps, The Art and Science of Genetic Modification: Re-Engineering 
Patent Law and Constitutional Orthodoxies, 11 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 1, 24 (2004) (sug-
gesting that Roe may generally secure a right to be free from prohibitions that interfere 
with life-saving treatment, and suggesting that this may make bans on human cloning 
unconstitutional). 
29 One might be able to distinguish abortion-as-self-defense from other procedures if 
the abortion right were justified on a sex equality rationale, as a means of preventing 
women from having to bear certain burdens when men aren’t required to bear comparable 
burdens.  See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1983); Regan, supra note 19.  But this is not 
the justification that the Court has generally given for the abortion right.  See, e.g., Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 177 (1973) (recognizing an abortion rights based on reproductive 
rights precedents, such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942), and family 
rights precedents, such as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1925), and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925),  that protected men as well as women); Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (citing Roe as support for a right to live 
with one’s family members, a right that protects men as well as women); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (citing Roe as support for a right to sexual autonomy, a 
right that protects men as well as women); cf. Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 
856 (1992) (noting the sex equality implications of Roe, but reaffirming Roe based mostly 
on other justifications). 
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The other procedures may cause harm to some government inter-
ests.  Ellen’s experimental drug may shorten Ellen’s already short ex-
pected lifespan.  It may also cost her money for what the government 
thinks may well be a false hope (though note that the pharmaceuticals 
in the Abigail Alliance case were merely not proven to be effective, 
rather than proven to be ineffective). 
Likewise, Denise’s paying for an organ might pressure some people 
into donating organs even when they might have preferred not to 
(though that likely isn’t that serious a harm if the donations are post-
humous, as they often are).  It would lead Denise to have more access to 
organs than poorer patients would (though a market for organs would 
likely increase the number of available organs, and would thus benefit 
poor patients as well as rich ones).  It might also be seen by some as 
immoral and socially harmful in the long term because it turns human 
body parts into commodities.  Any of these concerns is enough to let an 
organ sales ban, or a ban on the unapproved use of potentially lifesaving 
but unproven medicines, pass the rational basis test. 
Yet Roe and Casey demand much more than a rational relationship 
to a legitimate government interest before Alice’s right to abortion-as-
self-defense may be restricted.  Even the otherwise compelling interest 
in protecting the life of a viable fetus—a fetus that is in many ways in-
distinguishable from a born baby—doesn’t suffice to overcome Alice’s 
rights. 
The same should hold for other medical procedures used to protect 
one’s own life.  Modest burdens on the right to medical self-defense, 
such as an informed consent requirement or a waiting period (at least 
one short enough not to materially increase the risk to the patient’s life), 
would be constitutional.  But if the government imposes a substantial 
burden on the patient’s ability to protect her life through medical proce-
dures, the burden should be presumptively unconstitutional. 
At the very least the government should have to show an extremely 
powerful reason for burdening people’s medical self-defense rights, and 
to show that the burden is genuinely necessary, because the govern-
ment’s goals can’t be accomplished in some less burdensome ways.30 
And perhaps even when the interest is powerful in the abstract, it might 
still sometimes be rejected in favor of a person’s right to protect her own 
life, as the interest in protecting fetal life is rejected in the face of the 
abortion-as-self-defense right. 
 
30 See, e.g., Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 486 (concluding that the terminally ill have a 
presumptive constitutional right to get potentially lifesaving experimental drugs, but re-
manding to the district court to decide “whether the FDA’s policy barring access to post-
Phase I investigational new drugs by terminally ill patients is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest”). 
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There is, of course, at least one important limitation on the right to 
medical self-defense (or to self-defense more broadly31):  The right is in 
some measure constrained by the rights of others who aren’t threaten-
ing the woman’s life.  No woman has a constitutional right to force a 
doctor to perform an abortion at gunpoint, even to save her life.  Like-
wise, Ellen’s constitutional right to medical self-defense wouldn’t entitle 
her to steal the experimental drugs from the drugmaker, if the drug-
maker chooses not to sell them to her. 
But this is no different from the way other indisputably recognized 
constitutional rights operate:  My Free Press Clause rights don’t allow 
me to steal a printing press, though they guarantee me broad freedom 
to publish what I wish on my lawfully owned printing press.   My Free 
Speech Clause rights don’t give me a right to speak on your property 
(with some narrow exceptions that aren’t relevant here).32 Likewise, 
even during the Sherbert/Yoder era of constitutionally mandated exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws, I doubt that the Free Exercise 
Clause would have been read to allow religious pilgrims to trespass on 
private property, even if they believed that it was the site of a miracu-
lous apparition that they had a religious duty to observe.33 
This is not because property rights are more important than free 
speech rights, free exercise rights, or self-defense rights; rather, it’s be-
cause even important rights are bounded by the rights of others.  Natu-
rally the exact scope of those rights of others—do they include the right 
to reputation? to freedom from emotional distress? to freedom from of-
fense? to freedom from interferences with business relations?—has long 
been the subject of constitutional debates.34 But in our legal system an 
inherent, and I think necessary, aspect of constitutional rights is that 
they are bounded by at least some rights of others.  And the existence of 
such boundaries by no means contradicts the existence of the right, or 
weakens the right’s force when exercise of the right does not conflict 
with the rights of others. 
 
31 See also infra text accompanying notes 48-53 (discussing how the rights of others 
limit the lethal self-defense right). 
32 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
33 See generally Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1510-12 (1999); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious 
Exemptions—A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 621-23 n.89 
(1999). 
34 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Speech As Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal 
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1277, 1286-1311 (2005) (generally concluding that the right to free speech 
mostly includes the right to harm others’ interests through the communicative impact of 
speech—with some exceptions—but not the right to harm them through the noncommuni-
cative impact of speech, such as noise or trespass on private real estate). 
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III. LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE AND WHAT IT TELLS US ABOUT MEDICAL 
SELF-DEFENSE 
The judicial and popular acceptance of the abortion-as-self-defense 
right should be no surprise.  Throughout American history, protecting 
one’s life has also been an adequate justification for violating many 
other laws, including laws against homicide, battery, potentially dan-
gerous discharge of firearms, cruelty to animals, killing of endangered 
species, and destruction of another’s property.  If a person (or an ani-
mal) is threatening you with death, serious physical injury, rape, or 
kidnapping, you are entitled to defend yourself even using what would 
otherwise be unlawful killing. 
The analogy between lethal self-defense and medical self-defense is 
necessarily not as close as the analogy between one form of medical self-
defense (via abortion) and another; but, I will argue, it’s close enough.  
As a 1939 English case held,35 in reading a “life of the mother” exception 
into an abortion ban that didn’t expressly provide such an exception, “as 
in the case of homicide, so also in the case where an unborn child is 
killed, there may be justification [meaning self-defense] for the act.”  My 
hope is that people who feel strongly about the right to lethal self-
defense (as do I), but who are skeptical of what they see as newly 
minted rights, such as abortion rights or medical rights justified on pure 
autonomy grounds,36 will come to agree that the moral case for medical 
self-defense is at least as strong as the case for lethal self-defense. 
A. The Legal Status of Lethal Self-Defense—Generally 
American law has always recognized people’s rights to use deadly 
force to protect themselves against death or serious physical injury, and 
generally against rape or kidnapping as well.37 Many states even allow 
the use of deadly force to protect against robbery or burglary.38 
This right, of course, is the right to kill another, not just a right to 
introduce potentially lifesaving but potentially dangerous substances 
into one’s own body, or to acquire organs through a consensual transac-
 
35 King v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687, 690 (C.C.C. 1939). 
36 See Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures 
Market in Bodily, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 59-64 (1994) (discussing a possible constitutional 
privacy right to sell one’s organs); compare Karen L. Johnson, Note, The Sale of Human 
Organs: Implicating a Privacy Right, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 741, 754-55 (1987) (arguing that 
there is such a privacy right), with Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body,
80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 456-57 (2000) (arguing the contrary). 
37 See, e.g., 2 AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.04, at 48 & 
n.35 (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney) § 35.15(2)(a)-(b) (2004). 
38 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney) § 35.15(2)(b) (2004) (allowing the use of 
deadly force in defense against robbery); ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2006) (likewise as to bur-
glary).  Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(ii)(B) (allowing the use of deadly force against 
a burglar or robber if “the use of force other than deadly force to prevent the commission 
or the consummation of the crime would expose the actor . . . to substantial danger of seri-
ous bodily injury”); N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney) § 35.20(3) (2004) (likewise). 
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tion.  And this right covers even killing those who caused the danger 
through no moral fault (or minimal moral fault) of their own.  You may 
kill those who are threatening your life negligently, or even through an 
unfortunate nonnegligent accident.39 You may kill attackers who are 
insane or mentally retarded and thus not morally culpable.40 You may 
use self-defense against animals, even when such actions would other-
wise violate endangered species law, animal cruelty laws, or laws bar-
ring destruction of others’ property.41
Moreover, the existence of lethal self-defense as a defense to charges 
of murder endangers even those who aren’t attacking anyone.  Say that 
I cold-bloodedly want to murder you.  If the self-defense defense were 
unavailable, I would know that if I killed you, and physical evidence 
linked me to the attack, I would be convicted.  But the existence of the 
self-defense defense gives me a potential way to escape:  “He threatened 
 
39 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04, 3.11(1) (stating that deadly force may be 
used against “unlawful force” that imperils one’s life, and defining “unlawful force” as 
nonconsensual force that “would constitute [an] offense or tort”); 2 AM. LAW INST., MODEL 
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.11, at 159 (1985) (elaborating on this). 
40 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04, 3.11(1) (stating that deadly force may be 
used against “unlawful force” that imperils one’s life, and defining “unlawful force” as 
nonconsensual force that “would constitute [an] offense or tort except for a defense (such 
as the absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity [or such as] . . . youth)”; 2 AM. LAW 
INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 159 (1985) (noting that self-defense must 
be allowed even “against attacks by lunatics or children,” as well as against those who are 
merely negligent); 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(b), n.13 (1984 & 
Supp. 2005); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the 
Criminal Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 62 n.2 (1984); cf. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, SELF-
DEFENSE AND RIGHTS 6 (1977) (expressing the same view as a matter of moral philoso-
phy). 
41 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(b)(3) (providing self-defense defense in prosecutions for 
violating Endangered Species Act); 50 C.F.R. § 1740(b)(i)(B) (2004) (same); People v. Lee, 
131 Cal. App. 4th 1413 (2005) (holding that self-defense against an animal is a defense in 
an illegal discharge of firearm prosecution); People v. Wicker, 357 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1974) 
(holding same as to cruelty against animals prosecution); Grizzle v. State, 707 P.2d 1210 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (same); Credit v. Brown, 10 Johns. 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (hold-
ing that self-defense against an animal is a defense in a trespass action);  
Some might argue that we recognize self-defense only as a concession to human na-
ture, on the theory that the threat of immediate death exerts such a powerful compulsion 
on a person that she can’t be held responsible for her actions.  Under such a theory, self-
defense would be akin to the excuse of duress—not a right as such, but rather a circum-
stance that makes it cruel to punish the defender.  Yet the law treats self-defense (at least 
when it’s genuinely necessary, rather than founded on mistake) as justifying the act, 
rather than merely excusing it.  See, e.g., 2 ROBINSON, supra note 40, § 131, at 69.  More-
over, the law lets people use lethal force to defend others, including acquaintances and 
strangers rather than just relatives or close friends, even though the third party is 
unlikely to feel a duress-like compulsion to defend the person who needs defending.  See, 
e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05; 2 ROBINSON, supra note 40, § 133, at 101.  This shows 
that defending life against attack is treated as a positive good, not just a concession to 
human frailty.  Cf. Regan, supra note 19, at 1618 (likewise noting that comparing self-
defense with voluntary manslaughter, in which a tolerance of human frailty leads to miti-
gation of the offense, and of duress, in which a tolerance of human frailty leads to recogni-
tion of an excuse rather than justification, “makes it clear that the right of self-defense is 
not merely a concession to predictable human weakness”). 
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me, and I thought he was reaching for a gun,” I would falsely say, and 
the only other witness—you, the victim whom I am painting as the at-
tacker—won’t be there to contradict me. 
Such a defense isn’t guaranteed to prevail, since the jury could see 
through my lie.  But some jurors might believe me, or at least conclude 
that they lack enough reason to disbelieve me, especially if I’m a sympa-
thetic-seeming character (say, a police officer) and the person I killed is 
not.42 
I mention this because opponents of paid organ transplants some-
times argue that the availability of such transplants, even among en-
tirely consenting parties, risks fostering murder of people for their or-
gans.43 Of course we should worry about such murders, and take steps 
to prevent them and minimize their risks.  But the right to lethal self-
defense likewise risks fostering murder—yet we deal with this risk 
through case-by-case evaluation of the defender’s credibility, not by 
flatly banning lethal self-defense.44 
The right to lethal self-defense against humans, as opposed to the 
right to medical self-defense, protects not just our right to life but also 
our right to be free of domination by other people.  There may be an ex-
tra indignity in dying by another human’s despotic will, as opposed to 
from disease or through an animal’s attack.  
Yet a similar indignity exists when the law shackles you when 
you’re dying, through disease or animal attack, and denies to you the 
ability to fight back.  If there is a distinction between such a situation 
and the law’s barring people from lethally resisting criminal human at-
tack, it’s a distinction too gossamer to make a constitutional or moral 
difference. 
 
42 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered,
58 SO. CAL. L. REV. 777, 796 (1985). 
43 See sources cited infra note 162. 
44 Thus, even if you think that the right to lethal self-defense is justified largely by 
the conclusion that attackers have forfeited some of their rights by their attack, see, e.g.,
Sangero, supra note 5, at 507-11 (describing this argument)—even if they aren’t culpable, 
because they’re insane or mistaken—the exercise of lethal self-defense still causes harm.  
Such self-defense may cause the death of a criminal attacker, whose life may be worth 
less, but is presumably worth more than nothing.  It may involve the death of an innocent 
attacker, whose life is quite valuable even though his actions (but not his intentions) may 
be wrongful.  It may involve the death of an animal, the life of which is in my view worth 
much less than the life of a human, but again is not worth nothing (either because higher 
animals’ life generally has some value, because the animal’s owner has property rights, or 
because endangered species have some value).   And it may make it easier to kill the en-
tirely innocent with impunity, by making up a false story of self-defense. 
That we recognize self-defense despite these social costs suggests that we do treat 
self-defense as a right that trumps some nontrivial government interests.  And, as I argue 
in Parts IV and V, the government interests behind limits on experimental drug treat-
ments and on organ sales are no more capable of categorically trumping the self-defense 
right than are the government interests in protecting fetuses, criminal attackers, noncul-
pable attackers, animal attackers, or innocents who could be killed using false claims of 
self-defense. 
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The right to lethal self-defense is in some ways limited, as are other 
rights, and as the right to medical self-defense would be as well.  First, 
the right is firmly and broadly accepted only when the actor is defend-
ing his life, or some other very important interest:  You generally can’t 
kill to prevent a bruise or a petty theft.45 Similarly, I am arguing for 
medical self-defense against deadly or at least radically debilitating 
threats (such as paralysis or dementia), not the common cold. 
Second, in a minority of states, a person may not use lethal self-
defense outside his home when he could safely avoid the threat by re-
treating.46 Yet this is just a reflection of the necessity requirement; be-
cause lethal self-defense remains available when a safe retreat is im-
possible, the retreat rule (if applied properly) doesn’t substantially bur-
den a person’s right to defend his life against attack.  Likewise, if the 
law bans a procedure that is not medically necessary to protect a per-
son’s life or avert a grave threat to the person’s health, such a ban 
wouldn’t violate the person’s medical self-defense right.47
Third, the right to lethal self-defense, like other rights, doesn’t in 
my view include the right to injure the life, liberty, and property rights 
of third parties who aren’t threatening your life.  If I’m starving to death 
on a lifeboat, I have no right to kill and eat my fellow passengers.48 If a 
criminal forces me at gunpoint to kill someone, my actions won’t be le-
gally justified.49 Even if I merely want to take another’s property to 
save my life, that isn’t, I think, part of my medical self-defense rights. 
The law may reduce my sentence (as has sometimes happened in 
the lifeboat scenario50), provide a formal excuse (such as the duress de-
fense, in cases where one is forced to commit a crime that doesn’t in-
volve another’s death51), or even treat my action as justified (which the 
necessity defense recognized in about half the states would do, at least 
 
45 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 40, § 131(d), at 81-84. 
46 See id. § 131(c), at 79-81. 
47 As I note below, I don’t think that all aspects of current self-defense law are man-
dated by the Constitution or by a basic moral right to self-defense.  Most states, for in-
stance, do not impose a duty to retreat, even when retreating is quite safe; that may well 
be wise policy, but it’s part of the constitutionally and morally optional component of self-
defense, not part of the mandatory component.  In my view, the mandatory component, 
both of the constitutional and moral right to self-defense, is the right to do what is neces-
sary to prevent death (or serious bodily injury, rape, or a few other serious harms) without 
infringing the rights of others who aren’t attacking you, see infra note 53 
48 See Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, [1881-5] All E.R. Rep. 61, 1 T.L.R. 
118 (1884), aff’g 1 T.L.R. 29 (1884), amended 14 Q.B.D. 560 (1885).  But see United States 
v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1840) (suggesting that “sailor and sailor may 
lawfully struggle with each other for the plank which can save but one”). 
49 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 40, § 177(g)(1), at 367-68. 
50 A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: THE STORY OF THE 
TRAGIC LAST VOYAGE OF THE MIGNONETTE AND THE STRANGE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS TO 
WHICH IT GAVE RISE 247 (1984) (noting that Dudley’s and Stephens’ sentences for killing 
and eating their fellow lifeboat passenger were commuted to six months’ imprisonment). 
51 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 40, § 177, at 347. 
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as to mere injury to another’s property52).  Yet this, I think, flows from 
the legal system‘s sympathy and mercy towards the actor, not because 
the actor’s behavior is justifiable as part of the minimum right to self-
defense that a state should have to allow.  If the legal system sets aside 
this sympathy, and takes the view that deliberate harm to innocent 
third parties can never be permitted even when someone is trying to de-
fend his life, this wouldn’t violate the defender’s moral rights.53 
But while this limitation is both conceptually important and in some 
measure controversial (some might define the right to self-defense more 
broadly than I would, and include within it the right to inflict at least 
some harms on third parties), it doesn’t affect the standard medical self-
defense scenarios that I discuss.  Ellen doesn’t want to steal the drugs 
from the pharmaceutical company.  Olivia doesn’t want to cut an organ 
from a kidnap victim.  Even Alice is killing the fetus who is threatening 
her life, albeit threatening it with no moral culpability.   
B. Lethal Self-Defense, Medical Self-Defense, and Imminence 
Lethal self-defense is generally allowed only in response to immi-
nent threats of harm, usually measured in minutes; medical self-defense 
would often be used to prevent a death that’s likely in months.  But for 
medical self-defense, it makes sense to treat imminence as simply re-
quiring a present medical condition that seriously threatens life in the 
relatively near future—that is to say, as an application of a necessity 
requirement54—not as requiring that death be likely within the hour. 
The imminence requirement in lethal self-defense is aimed at serv-
ing several functions.  First, imminence is a proxy for availability of al-
ternatives, and thus for the necessity of lethal response—the further 
away the harm, the likelier it is that nonlethal means (escape, calling 
the police, and the like) will protect the actor’s life.55 
Second, imminence is a proxy for likelihood of harm, and thus again 
for necessity of lethal response:  Humans change their minds, and a 
threat made in anger will often fade away as the threatener’s passions 
cool.56 
52 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 40, §124(a), at 45; id. § 124(g), at 63 (noting that some 
states bar the necessity defense for charges of murder, or even for other serious felonies). 
53 See text accompanying notes 31-34 (discussing this in more detail). 
54 Cf. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 40, § 131(b)(3) (so describing the proper function of the 
imminence requirement); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 495 (3d ed. 2000) (likewise); 
Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEG. THEORY 265, 292-93 (1999) (like-
wise); Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batter-
ers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 380 (1993) (likewise); Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-
Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. 
REV. 211, 276-82 (2002) (likewise). 
55 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 54, at 495; David Gauthier, Self-Defense and the Re-
quirement of Imminence, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 616-17 (1996); George P. Fletcher, 
Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 570 (1996). 
56 See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters: 
Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Monsters, in CRIMINAL 
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Third, imminence is a proxy for the accuracy of the defender’s judg-
ment that lethal response is necessary:  You’re usually less likely to be 
mistaken about the intentions of a man pointing a gun at you than 
about the intentions of someone who merely said that he’d like to kill 
you one day.57
Fourth, the imminence requirement helps constrain mass gang war-
fare; without the requirement, opposing gang members would be free to 
kill each other with (legal) impunity, since they could always plausibly 
argue that their mortal enemies in the other gang may attack them on 
some future occasion.58
Fifth, the imminence requirement helps cabin people’s ability to get 
away with murder by falsely pleading self-defense.  This ability is po-
tentially present even under a self-defense regime that requires immi-
nence; “I thought he was reaching for a gun” is already an available lie 
that the pretend defender can use.  But the risk of such false claims of 
self-defense would be even greater if “he had told me some time before 
that he wanted to kill me” were justification enough.  Anyone whom you 
had recently threatened in a heated moment would have a continuing 
ability to kill you, even if he doesn’t sincerely believe that you’re threat-
ening him but instead has a murderous motive that he will cloak in a 
claim of self-defense. 
Sixth, generally insisting on tools that help show necessity, help 
show aggression on the killed person’s part, and help weed out false 
claims is especially important because the harm of unnecessary self-
defense is so grave—a death that could have been averted.   
For medical self-defense, all these functions would best be served by 
seeing imminence as simply requiring a present medical threat.  It is 
the presentness of the medical threat (your kidneys are actually sick, as 
opposed to your wanting to take medicine prophylactically to prevent 
possible future sickness) and the lack of a satisfactory approved therapy 
that are the best proxy for necessity.  You can’t run away from a failing 
kidney that can be repaired only through a transplant, or call the police 
to protect you 
Moreover, present medical threats of future harm, while never com-
pletely certain, are much more reliably diagnosable than human 
threats.  There is no need to worry about self-defense claims being used 
as a justification for street warfare by rival gangs.  There is little need 
to screen out insincere or unreliable claims of danger, especially since 
the diagnosis is usually made by a trained and objective medical expert, 
not the patient.  And even if an error happens, the error will likely en-
danger others much less than erroneous lethal self-defense would. 
 
LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 259, 274-75 (Stephen Shute & A.P. 
Simester eds., 2002). 
57 See, e.g., Gauthier, supra note 55, at 617. 
58 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq,
46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 255 (2004). 
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These reasons help explain why the law doesn’t distinguish a 
woman who gets a post-viability abortion to save her life from immedi-
ate danger (her pregnancy was threatening likely immediate death) 
from a woman who gets a post-viability abortion to save her life from 
real but not immediate danger (her pregnancy was threatening likely 
death in a month).  So long as the dangerous medical condition cur-
rently exists, the woman may defend herself against the risk right 
away, especially since waiting may increase the danger.  The same 
should apply to other forms of medical self-defense. 
C. Substantial Burdens on Lethal Self-Defense 
The chief, and most controversial, substantial burden on people’s 
ability to practice lethal self-defense is found in certain kinds of gun 
control laws: (a) total bans on all guns, and (b) bans on the carrying of 
guns on one’s person.  Such laws don’t ban self-defense, but they do sub-
stantially decrease people’s ability to defend themselves, by denying 
them a tool that is more effective for self-defense than other tools would 
be.59 (An analogy would be a law that allows abortion-as-self-defense, 
but bars women from using the safest and most reliable late-term abor-
tion procedures, and leaves them only with other, much less life-
protective procedures.60)
Yet even these laws are generally politically justified on a theory 
that they are necessary to protect innocent lives (sometimes coupled 
with claims that guns really aren’t on balance effective defensive tools), 
because any lesser regulations wouldn’t do the job.61 Guns, the argu-
ment often goes, kill 30,000 Americans a year (13,000 if we exclude sui-
cide and shootings by the police),62 and protect many fewer Americans 
than they kill;63 we could reduce the aggregate death toll only by ban-
ning them, or banning the carrying of them.64 The analogy would be a 
 
59 See GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 167-75 (1997).  
This makes sense, largely because a gun is a more powerful deterrent than most other op-
tions.  If you were a rapist or a robber, what would be most likely to lead you to run 
away—the victim’s saying “I have a can of mace” or “I have a gun”?  If you were a burglar, 
which would deter you more: a sign saying “protected by armed patrol” or one saying “pro-
tected by unarmed patrol”? 
60 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000) (holding that “[w]here a signifi-
cant body of medical opinion believes [an abortion] procedure may bring with it greater 
safety for some patients and explains the medical reasons supporting that view,” a woman 
is entitled to get such a procedure performed in order to protect her life or health, even if 
there is a “division of medical opinion” about the value of the procedure). 
61 See, e.g., JOSH SUGARMANN, EVERY HANDGUN IS AIMED AT YOU: THE CASE FOR 
BANNING HANDGUNS (2002). 
62 Nat’l Ctr. for Injury Prevention & Control, WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 
1999-2003, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_sy.html (query for All Intents, 
Firearms, 2003); id. (query for Homicide); id. (query for Unintentional); id. (query for Un-
determined Intent). 
63 See, e.g., SUGARMANN, supra note 61, at 55-70. 
64 Id. at 177-201. 
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restriction on medical self-defense that’s aimed at preventing (say) the 
spread of communicable diseases, or serious and unavoidable risk of 
widespread murder aimed at involuntarily harvesting people’s organs—
a risk more serious than the risk to sick patients of not allowing organ 
sales. 
Moreover, even in the face of the harm to innocents from private 
gun possession (a harm I can’t deny, though I generally think that most 
serious gun controls would on balance cause more harm than they 
avoid65), American law has generally come out in favor of gun ownership 
rights.  Here’s the broad shape of gun control law in America: 
(1) In all jurisdictions except one—the District of Columbia—law-
abiding adults are legally entitled to possess loaded shotguns in their 
own homes.66 Even the most restrictive other jurisdictions, such as Chi-
cago, ban only the possession of handguns, and leave people the right to 
possess shotguns,67 which are on balance about as effective as handguns 
for home defense (and are even more lethal).68
(2) In about three-quarters of the states (38 of the 50), law-abiding 
adults are entitled to carry guns in most places outside the home either 
without a license or with a license that the police department is gener-
ally required to issue,69 though this number has varied considerably 
over the years.70 Moreover, self-defense is a valid defense to charges of 
unlawful firearms possession, so long as the defendant armed himself 
temporarily in response to an imminent threat.71 In many states that 
don’t automatically allow law-abiding adults firearms carry licenses, 
 
65 See generally KLECK, supra note 59. 
66 Even in D.C., one is free to keep a shotgun unloaded and locked, D.C. CODE § 7-
2507.02, so that it’s available (with a little effort) when needed for immediate self-defense, 
see Horton v. United States, 541 A.2d 604, 608 n.5 (D.C. 1988) (noting that self-defense is 
a defense to weapons charges). 
67 See, e.g., CHI. MUN. CODE § 8-20-040, -050 (generally requiring registration of fire-
arms, barring registration of most handguns and thus making their possession illegal, but 
allowing registration of shotguns). 
68 See GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 463 (1991). 
69 See Nicholas Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 715, 
753-54 & nn.217-252 (2005) (collecting statutes). 
70 As recently as the 1980s, the number was only six of the 50 states, though many 
other states had discretionary policies under which individual police departments could be 
quite free with permits.  See Richard Getchell, Carrying Concealed Weapons in Self-
Defense: Florida Adopts Uniform Regulations for the Issuance of Concealed Weapons Per-
mits, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 751, 757 & n.30, 758 (1987) (reporting that immediately before 
1987 there were five states that allowed all law-abiding adults meeting certain broad ob-
jective criteria to get licenses, and citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2003(1)(D), (4), 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.713-714 (West Supp. 1987), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23-7-7.1 
(Supp. 1987), UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-10-513(2) (Supp. 1987), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.41.070(1) (Supp. 1987)); Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New 
Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 682 (1995) (noting that 
Vermont has always allowed people to carry concealed firearms without a license). 
71 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(1) (allowing the otherwise illegal carrying 
of a firearm when actively engaged in self-defense); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1322 
(same). 
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even nonimminent danger—so long as it’s well above what the average 
person faces—is a factor in favor of granting the license, or of rendering 
the license requirement inapplicable.72 In other states, the concealed 
weapons restrictions are waived for people who have shown sufficient 
threat from an identifiable potential attacker.73 
(3) The only serious restrictions on the possession of guns for home 
defense are on special categories of people—felons, sometimes violent 
misdemeanants, sometimes drug addicts and the insane, and minors—
who are seen as especially likely to use guns irresponsibly.74 Nonethe-
less, even these groups of people remain free to defend themselves in 
their homes with many other lethal weapons.  And even members of 
these groups are entitled to possess firearms when they are in truly 
imminent danger.75 
This pattern generally fits well with the lethal self-defense right I 
describe—a right that (a) is generally available, that (b) presumptively 
may neither be banned nor substantially burdened, but that (c) may be 
substantially burdened when the danger to others’ lives is so grave as to 
overcome the right’s value in protecting lives.  In law-abiding citizens’ 
 
72 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2923.12(D) (providing exception from concealed carry 
prohibition when “the actor was engaged in or was going to or from the actor’s lawful 
business or occupation, which business or occupation was of a character or was necessarily 
carried on in a manner or at a time or place as to render the actor particularly susceptible 
to criminal attack, such as would justify a prudent person in going armed,” or when “the 
actor was engaged in a lawful activity and had reasonable cause to fear a criminal attack 
upon the actor, a member of the actor’s family, or the actor’s home, such as would justify a 
prudent person in going armed”); Orange County (Calif.) Sheriff’s Department, Require-
ments [for Concealed Carry Permits], http://www.ocsd.org/CCWPermit/Requirements.asp 
(noting various factors that would constitute “good cause” for issuance of the permit, most 
of which focus on the applicant’s exposure to a greater than normal risk of attack). 
73 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12025.5 (providing that concealed carrying, even 
without a permit, “is justifiable when a person who possesses a firearm reasonably be-
lieves that he or she is in grave danger because of circumstances forming the basis of a 
current restraining order issued by a court against another person or persons who has or 
have been found to pose a threat to his or her life or safety”); OHIO REV. CODE § 2923.1213 
(providing that people may get temporary emergency concealed carry licenses when they 
“reasonable cause to fear a criminal attack upon the person or a member of the person’s 
family, such as would justify a prudent person in going armed,” and noting the existence 
of a protective order as possible evidence supporting such reasonable cause); see also N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-415.15(b) (providing for a special emergency concealed carry permit, ex-
empted from the possible 90-day delay for issuance of standard permits, when “the sheriff 
reasonably believes is in an emergency situation that may constitute a risk of safety to the 
person, the person’s family or property,” with “proof of a protective order” being specifi-
cally listed as being “evidence of an emergency situation”; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(c1) (re-
quiring the clerk of court to tell people who receive protection orders about their rights to 
apply for the emergency concealed carry permit). 
74 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (3), (4), (9). 
75 For cases holding that state or federal bans on possession of firearms by felons 
don’t apply when the felon picked up the gun for self-defense against an imminent deadly 
threat, see, e.g., United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1996); People v. King, 582 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Cal. 
1978); State v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987); State v. Hardy, 397 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio 
App. 1978); Conaty v. Solem, 422 N.W.2d 102, 104 (S.D. 1988). 
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homes, American law has almost always struck the balance in favor of 
the possession of guns (the most effective lethal self-defense tools) for 
self-defense.  Outside the home, where the threat to others is seen as 
greater, the balance is today usually struck in favor of allowing guns, 
but not in all states.  And guns are allowed to all except those categories 
of people that are seen as posing extraordinarily serious threats. 
Moreover, even those who disagree with this result generally do so 
either on the grounds that guns aren’t really that useful for self-defense, 
so that a ban is no great burden, or that private gun possession is so 
dangerous that the burden on self-defense is justified.  And adopting ei-
ther of these views by no means undermines a right to medical self-
defense:  The public safety reasons for limiting armed lethal self-defense 
just don’t apply to medical self-defense. 
One can thus support gun bans and yet oppose restrictions on life-
saving medical procedures.  It’s much harder to justify the opposite posi-
tion (which is the position at which our legal system has arrived): the 
position that everyone should be free to own a gun for lethal self-
defense, yet that people shouldn’t be free to engage in medical self-
defense. 
D. Is Self-Defense a Constitutional Right? 
Abortion-as-self-defense, the Court has held, is a constitutional 
right.  The status of lethal self-defense is not as clear, especially because 
lethal self-defense has been so broadly recognized by common law and 
statute that courts have rarely had occasion to confront grave restric-
tions on the right. 
In two categories of cases, a few courts have categorically rejected 
the existence of a federal constitutional right to self-defense.  A few 
states place the burden on defendants to prove self-defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence;76 this was also the common-law rule,77 though 
nearly all states have retreated from it.  Some courts that have upheld 
this rule have reasoned that there’s no constitutional right to self-
defense.78 
But such a broad ruling isn’t required to decide the matter—one can 
have a constitutional right, and yet be required to prove that the condi-
tions for the exercise of the right are satisfied.79 When the Supreme 
 
76 See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987) (noting that in 1987, only Ohio and 
South Carolina had such a rule); State v. Bellamy, 359 S.E.2d 63, 64-64 (S.C. 1987) (re-
treating from this rule). 
77 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES *201. 
78 See, e.g., White v. Arn, 788 F.2d 338, 347 (6th Cir. 1986). 
79 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (stating that the de-
fendant bears the burden of proving denial of the Sixth Amendment right to effective as-
sistance of counsel); Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473, 504 (Miss. 2002) (stating that the de-
fendant bears the burden of showing that his Due Process Clause rights were violated by 
prejudicial pre-indictment delay); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10 & n.58, § 18.5 & n.47 (2006) (noting both these points). 
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Court upheld these rules,80 it did so without opining on whether there’s 
a constitutional right to self-defense.  On the other hand, some opinions 
have suggested that there is such a right,81 and a recent four-Justice 
plurality opinion—authored by Justice Scalia, usually no friend of un-
enumerated constitutional rights—suggested the same.82 
Some prisons’ disciplinary proceedings also categorically reject self-
defense as a defense to the charge of battery or attempted murder 
among prisoners, even when the charged person claims he was trying to 
protect himself from murder or rape.  Some courts have upheld these 
rules, and in the process broadly asserted that there’s no constitutional 
right to self-defense.83 Yet even if prisoners ought to lack a constitu-
tional right to self-defense,84 this should tell us little about the constitu-
tional right to self-defense outside prison.  Prisoners are subject to far 
greater constraints on most of their constitutional rights (such as free 
speech, freedom from religious discrimination, and protection from 
searches and seizures) than are those who are outside prison.85 
Moreover, the Court’s unenumerated rights caselaw provides a 
strong case for recognizing a presumptive federal constitutional right to 
self-defense (at least outside prison).  The right to self-defense is impor-
tant to people’s lives, and firmly rooted in American tradition, from be-
fore the Framing to the present.86 Like the right to bear and raise chil-
 
80 Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987). 
81 See, e.g., Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 851-52 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that 
“the right of a defendant in a criminal trial to assert self-defense is one of those funda-
mental rights” that are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental”); Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J., dis-
senting) (“I believe that the Constitution prohibits a state from eliminating the justifica-
tion of self-defense”), rev’d on other grounds, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); opinions cited infra note 
84. 
82 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (plurality) (dictum) (suggesting that 
“the historical record may support” the proposition that “the right to have a jury consider 
self-defense evidence . . . is fundamental”). 
83 E.g., Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1993). 
84 See id. at 1054-56 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (concluding that even prisoners have a 
constitutional right to self-defense); see also DeCamp v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrections, 2006 
WL 2068082, *5-*6 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006) (endorsing Judge Ripple’s dissent and 
mandating that prisoners be allowed a self-defense defense in prison disciplinary hear-
ings; the opinion is ambiguous, though, on whether this judgment was a matter of “State 
due-process guarantees,” i.e., state constitutional law, or “State laws” more broadly).  
85 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (free speech); O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (religious freedom); see also MacMillan v. Pontesso, 73 Fed. 
Appx. 213, 214 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to decide whether there is a general “constitu-
tional right to assert self-defense,” and holding simply that no such right can be asserted 
in prison disciplinary proceedings, citing Turner v. Safley); Sack v. Canino, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12093, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (relying on Rowe, but only for the proposition that a 
prisoner “had no constitutional right to assert a claim of self-defense within the context of 
a prison disciplinary hearing”). 
86 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (stressing that the Due Process 
Clause protects rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”); see 
generally Nicholas H. Johnson, Self-Defense?, __ GEO. MASON. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2006) (arguing for recognizing a constitutional right to self-defense, both under the Second 
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dren, or the right to live with one’s family members, it has been recog-
nized throughout American history, and throughout the breadth of the 
nation.  Framing-era documents refer to it as a natural right.87 Black-
stone wrote of the right to prevent “any forcible and atrocious crime,” 
even with lethal force, as “justifiable by the law of nature”;88 St. George 
Tucker, one of the leading American commentators of the first half of 
the nineteenth century,89 described “[t]he right of self defence” as “the 
first law of nature.”90
The right has certainly been more broadly accepted than the right to 
an abortion, or even than the right to use and buy contraceptives.91
Amendment and under the Ninth Amendment); Victoria Dorfman & Michael Koltonyuk, 
When the Ends Justify the Reasonable Means: Self-Defense and the Right to Counsel, 3
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 381, 382-89 (1999) (arguing that the Constitution secures an unenu-
merated right to self-defense). 
87 See, e.g., Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists: The Report of the Committee 
of Correspondence to the Boston Town Meeting, Nov. 20, 1772; PENN. CONST. art. 1, § 1 
(1776); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. I (1777); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1 (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, 
art. 2 (1784); DEL. CONST. pmbl. (1792). 
88 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES *180.  Part of Blackstone’s logic was that offenses 
which carried the death penalty (and no other offenses)—offenses that in 1765 England 
included murder, rape, and robbery—could be resisted with death, id. at *182; but this 
limitation rapidly fade away in America with the reduction in the number of capital of-
fenses, see, e.g., 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 
189 n.* (John L. Wendell ed. 1847) (specifically noting this shift); see also, e.g., State v. 
Baynard, 1 Del. Cas. 662 (Oyer & Ter. 1794) (noting that “defense against a felonious at-
tempt on a man’s person or dwelling house, attended with force” would justify homicide, 
though petty felonies might not).  Blackstone also reports that defensive homicides com-
mitted in the midst of a fight were generally treated as mere excusable homicide, rather 
than justifiable, but only on the grounds that “in quarrels both parties may be, and usu-
ally are, in some fault,” whereas “where I kill a thief that breaks into my house” (to Black-
stone, a classic case of justifiable homicide, alongside killing rapists, robbers, and murder-
ers), “the original default can never be upon my side.”  4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 
*187; see also WILLIAM O. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 667 (5th 
ed. 1850) (treating as justifiable homicide a person’s “repel[ling] force by force in defence of 
his person, habitation, or property, against one who manifestly intends and endeavours by 
violence or surprise, to commit a known felony upon either”); United States v. Travers, 28 
F. Cas. 204, 211 (C.C. D. Mass. 1814) (Story, J., charging jury) (explaining that excusable 
self-defense in “a sudden combat” “differs from justifiable self-defense, properly so called, 
in this, that the necessity has in some measure arisen from [the defender’s] own fault” in 
getting involved in the fight); Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II—Honest but 
Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 472, 473 (1987) (like-
wise concluding that self-defense in a mutual combat “was excusable because the actor 
was at least partially to blame for the ultimate melee which resulted in death,” while out-
side “mutual combat,” “the ultimate slayer . . . was the innocent and unprovoking victim of 
a violent assault or other crime, such as robbery”). 
89 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296 n.2 (1964) (Black, J., 
concurring); CRAIG EVAN KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LE-
GAL THOUGHT 13, 31-50, 74 (1993); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making And The Nation: The 
Historical Foundations Of The Nationalist Conception Of The Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 1075, 1206 (2000); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force 
of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1178 (2002). 
90 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. 300 (1803). 
91 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139-40 & n.37 (1973) (noting that most states 
outlawed many abortions by the late 1800s, that nearly all did by the late 1950s, and that 
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Even if due process or the Ninth Amendment is interpreted as protect-
ing only those rights that were recognized as important common-law 
rights in 1791 (or possibly 1868), self-defense would qualify.92 It has 
never been absolute, but in this respect it is like most constitutional 
rights, enumerated or unenumerated. 
Finally, the right is secured, either expressly or by strong implica-
tion from expressly secured rights to keep and bear arms, by forty-three 
state constitutions.  Twenty-one of these forty-three, dating back to the 
1776 Pennsylvania Bill of Rights,93 expressly list the right to “defend[] 
life” as one of their foundations.94 Thirty-nine of the forty-three secure a 
right to keep and bear arms in defense of self, for instance, “The people 
have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, rec-
reation or any other lawful purpose,” added to the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion in 1998, and “Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of 
himself and the state,” enacted in 1818 in Connecticut’s first state con-
stitution.95 Such a right presupposes the existence of at least the tradi-
tional core of lethal self-defense.96 
by 1973, only a few states had generally legalized most early-term abortions); Comment, 
The History and Future of the Legal Battles Over Birth Control, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 275, 278-
79 (1964) (noting that by 1964, only two states prohibited the sale of contraceptives). 
92 For a view that American history and the original meaning of the Ninth Amend-
ment support reading it as protecting even a right to self-defense using firearms, see 
Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed 
Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992). For my purposes, it is enough 
that American law has consistently, including in 1791 and 1868, recognized a right to self-
defense generally, even if that right is interpreted to tolerate a great deal of weapons con-
trols. 
93 See PENN. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (1776). 
94 See ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3; DEL.
CONST. pmbl.; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 1; 
KY. CONST. art. 1; MAINE CONST. art. 1, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1; MONT. CONST. art. 
2, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2; N.J. CONST. art. 1, ¶ 1; N.M. 
CONST. art. 2, § 4; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1; PENN. CONST. art. 1, § 
1; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1; People v. 
McDonnell, 163 P. 1046 (Cal. App. 1917) (holding that, given the California Constitution’s 
“defending life” provision, the legislature cannot “deprive a person—at least a person who 
is not a wrongdoer—of the right of self-defense,” because “[t]he right to defend life is one of 
the inalienable rights guaranteed by the constitution of the state”); Escalante v. Wilson’s 
Art Studio, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187 (Cal. App. 2003) (dictum) (likewise), depublished 
without opinion; People v. Rich, 2002 WL 1609058 (Cal. App. 2002) (dictum) (likewise), 
depublished without opinion. This formulation dates back at least to Samuel Adams, who 
began his The Rights of the Colonists: The Report of the Committee of Correspondence to 
the Boston Town Meeting, Nov. 20, 1772, with very similar language, which he character-
ized as self-evidently true:  “Among the natural rights of the Colonists are these: First, a 
right to life; Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right to support 
and defend them in the best manner they can.  These are evident branches of, rather than 
deductions from, the duty of self-preservation, commonly called the first law of nature.” 
95 Provisions that protect every person’s (or every citizen’s) “right to bear arms in de-
fense of himself,” or something similar (19 states):  ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 26; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; 
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; MISSOURI CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11(1); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, 
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If the Court accepts the Second Amendment as securing an individ-
ual right aimed partly at self-defense, thus endorsing the view ex-
pressed several times by Congress97 and in 2004 by the Office of Legal 
 
art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. 
III, § 22. 
Provisions that protect “[t]he right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of 
themselves and the state,” or something similar, and that have been interpreted as pro-
tecting a right to keep firearms for self-defense (8 states):  FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; Alexan-
der v. State, 450 So.2d 1212 (Fla. App. 1984); IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; Kellogg v. City of 
Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990); KY. CONST. § 1; Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 
S.W.3d 170, 180 (Ky. 2006); PENN. CONST. art. 1, § 21; Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 
291 (1879); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; Conaty v. Solem, 422 N.W.2d 102, 104 (S.D. 1988); 
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16; State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610 (Vt. 1903); WISC. CONST. art. I, § 25; 
State v. Fisher, 714 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 2006); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24; State v. McAdams, 
714 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wyo. 1986). 
Provisions that mention the right to bear arms without expressly mentioning self-
defense, but that have been interpreted as protecting individuals’ right to keep firearms 
for self-defense (11 states).  ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5; Arkansas Game and Fish Com'n v. 
Murders, 327 Ark. 426 (1997); Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878); GA. CONST. art. I, § 
VIII; McCoy v. State, 157 Ga. 767 (1924); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11; In re Brickey, 70 P. 
609 (Idaho 1902); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 
N.E.2d 266, 273 (Ill. 1984); LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; MAINE CONST. art. I, § 16; State v. Cha-
isson, 457 So.2d 1257, 1259 (La. App. 1984); State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816 (Me. 1990); N.C. 
CONST. art. 1, § 30; State v. Kerner. 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; 
Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993); ORE. CONST. art. I, § 27; State v. 
Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Ore. 2005); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22; Mosby v. Devine, 851 
A.2d 1031, 1043 (R.I. 2004); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26; State v. Foutch, 34 S.W. 1, 1 (Tenn. 
1896). 
Provision that protects the right to bear arms, specifically describes the right as indi-
vidual, and was enacted in 1994, a time when the individual right to bear arms was gen-
erally understood as aimed at protecting self-defense (1 state): ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19. 
Three state constitutional provisions speak generally of a right to bear arms in terms 
quite similar to those in the Second Amendment, and state courts have not decided 
whether or not they secure an individual right.  HAW. CONST. art. I, § 17; S.C. CONST. art. 
1, § 20; VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.  Two state constitutional provisions have been interpreted 
as not securing an individual right.  KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 4; City of Salina v. 
Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905), adhered to by City of Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292 
(Kan. 1975), MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 17; Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 
1976).  But see City of Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Kan. 1979) (striking 
down a gun control law, challenged by an individual citizen, on the grounds that it was 
“unconstitutionally overbroad,” and thus implicitly concluding that the right to bear arms 
did indeed belong to individual citizens); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(22) (stating, in a 
statute providing that any law-abiding adults who meet certain objective criteria may get 
a license to carry concealed guns, that “The legislature of the State of Minnesota recog-
nizes and declares that the second amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees the fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms”; Minnesota is one of the six 
states that doesn’t have a right-to-bear-arms provision in its constitution).  
96 For cases treating the state constitutional right to bear arms for defense of self 
guarantee as securing a right to self-defense, see, e.g., McKellar v. Mason, 159 So.2d 700, 
702 (La. App. 1964); State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Ore. 2005); Webb v. State, 439 
S.W.2d 342, 343 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1969); State v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 142, 146 
(W. Va. 1988). 
97 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(2) (enacted 2005) 
(finding that “The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 
rights of individuals, including those who are not members of a militia or engaged in mili-
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Counsel,98 though only by a minority of federal circuit judges,99 then 
some right to self-defense might be inherently protected through the 
Second Amendment.  But even if the Court doesn’t endorse the view 
that the Second Amendment presupposes (perhaps among other things) 
an individual right aimed at self-defense against criminals, the Court 
might still protect at least some sort of lethal self-defense—even if self-
defense potentially limitable by stringent gun control laws—under the 
Ninth Amendment or the Due Process Clause.100 The longstanding his-
tory of legal allowance of lethal self-defense, coupled with the state con-
stitutional tradition of “defending life” provisions and right to bear arms 
provisions, strongly supports treating the right as no less protected than 
parental rights, contraceptive rights, and abortion rights. 
IV. MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE AND A RIGHT OF THE TERMINALLY ILL TO 
USE EXPERIMENTAL MEDICAL TREATMENTS 
Let us then turn from Alice and Katherine to Ellen, who is termi-
nally ill.  Existing therapies, doctors say, are useless.  An experimental 
drug offers some hope, and has been shown to be safe in FDA Phase I 
 
tary service or training, to keep and bear arms”); Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub.L. 
99-308, sec. 1(b) (1986), quoted at 18 U.S.C. § 921 Historical and Statutory Notes (finding 
that “the rights of citizens . . . to keep and bear arms under the second amendment to the 
United States Constitution . . . require additional legislation to correct existing firearms 
statutes and enforcement policies”); Freedmen’s Bureau Act, 39th Cong. sess. I, ch. 200 
(1866) (providing that “to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concern-
ing personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of 
estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured 
to and enjoyed by all the citizens of such State or district without respect to race or color, 
or previous condition of slavery”); H.R. 5013, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 2(1) (July 26, 
2006) (finding that “Congress has repeatedly recognized [the] language [of the Second 
Amendment] as protecting an individual right”) (passed by the House of Representatives, 
now being considered by the Senate). 
98 Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 2004 WL 2930974 
(O.L.C. Aug. 24, 2004). 
99 See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001); Silveira v. Lockyer, 
328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that Judges Gould, Kleinfeld, Kozinski, T.G. Nelson, 
O’Scannlain, and Pregerson endorsed the individual rights view in dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (Coffey, J., 
dissenting) (endorsing the individual rights view); cf. United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 
1279, 1288 (10th Cir. 2004) (Kelly, J., concurring) (noting that the individual rights view 
“is deserving of serious consideration,” though concluding that the case can be resolved 
without deciding whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right, and that 
“there is no need to dilute prematurely what many consider to be one of the most impor-
tant amendments to the United States Constitution”); Runnebaum v. NationsBank of 
Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 170 n.8 (1997) (en banc) (noting off-handedly that “indi-
viduals have the constitutional right to peaceably assemble, see U.S. Const. amend. I; and 
to ‘keep and bear Arms,’ U.S. Const. amend. II,” though the Fourth Circuit generally ad-
heres to the collective rights view of the Amendment, see United States v. Hager, 22 Fed. 
Appx. 130, 132 (4th Cir. 2001); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
100 For a brief discussion of the general objections to recognizing unenumerated 
rights, even traditionally recognized ones, see the text following note 107. 
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tests; but it is outlawed by federal drug law, because it has not yet been 
shown effective. 
As I’ve suggested, Ellen’s right to medical self-defense should ex-
empt her—and the doctors and pharmaceutical companies whose assis-
tance she needs—from the FDA’s ban.  Alice may kill her viable fetus to 
protect her life, and may enlist her doctor’s help in doing so.  Katherine 
may kill her attackers, whether guilty humans, morally innocent (in-
sane, retarded, or mistaken) humans, or morally innocent animals.  
Ellen should have at least an equal right to simply ingest certain medi-
cines, without threatening anyone else’s life. 
This is not a general autonomy argument, premised on the theory 
that all people should be entitled to ingest whatever they choose into 
their body; such an argument would strike down a wide range of medi-
cal regulations, including most laws banning recreational drugs, and 
would do so with little support in the Court’s precedents and in Ameri-
can legal tradition.101 Rather, it’s an argument specifically focused on 
the right to self-defense, a right supported both by the Court’s caselaw 
(Roe and Casey) and by the longstanding acceptance of the right to le-
thal self-defense.102 
What justification can the government have for limiting Ellen’s 
rights?  Ellen’s use of experimental drugs may potentially jeopardize 
what little time she has.103 Yet if people are free to try to protect their 
lives even by taking a viable fetus’s life, or by taking an attacker’s life, 
they should be as free to risk their own short remaining spans in the 
service of trying to lengthen those spans.104 
101 Cf. Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting a 
claimed constitutional right to use laetrile merely as a nutritional supplement to prevent 
cancer, a claim that focuses on medical autonomy rather than self-defense against a pre-
sent life-threatening disease).  
102 This helps show, I think, why the Abigail Alliance dissent, 445 F.3d at 494-95 
(Griffith, J., dissenting), erred in pointing to the longstanding regulation of the distribu-
tion of pharmaceuticals as evidence that the right to medical self-defense can’t be consti-
tutionally recognized under the Glucksberg tradition test.  See supra note 86 and accom-
panying text (briefly discussing Glucksberg).  Indeed, pharmaceutical distribution has 
long been subject to regulation.  But so has abortion, and so has the use of lethal force.  
The right to self-defense has long coexisted with such regulations, precisely because it has 
been a narrow exception to the regulations.  We can have a tradition of self-defense (medi-
cal or lethal) in cases where the self-defense is needed to protect the rightsholder’s life, 
while still having a tradition of regulation in all the other cases. 
103 Government Brief in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. 
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 2005 WL 1900323, *45 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5350). 
104 The interest in protecting the patient’s life may be more applicable if Ellen wanted 
to use risky experimental drugs to avoid (or cure) serious but non-life-threatening injury—
blindness, paralysis, and the like.  The abortion-as-self-defense right and the lethal self-
defense right both apply even when the rightsholder is trying to protect herself from seri-
ous bodily injury, not just from death; the medical self-defense right may presumptively 
apply in such situations, too.  But in such non-life-threatening situations, the government 
can at least credibly claim that its interest in saving the patient’s life—notwithstanding 
her willingness to risk her life to prevent or cure something that’s dramatically harming 
her quality of life—trumps the patient’s medical self-defense rights.  When the patient is 
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Paternalistic government interests are adequate where no constitu-
tional rights are involved; but they shouldn’t justify an interference 
with a person’s right to protect her own life.  And while I think this is so 
even if the drugs haven’t been tested for safety, it should be especially 
clear when the drugs have passed the Phase I safety trials, as they did 
in Abigail Alliance.
Ellen’s use of experimental drugs may also cost her money, which 
may prove to be wasted.  Yet this risk, too, doesn’t measure up to the 
harms that have proven to be insufficient to trump one’s self-defense 
rights. 
Bans on the use of experimental drugs might also interfere with 
randomized clinical drug studies.105 It’s possible that so many termi-
nally ill patients will insist on getting a not fully tested but promising 
drug that it will be impossible to scientifically test the drug’s effective-
ness—if people can just buy the drug, they won’t want to enroll in a 
study in which they might get a placebo instead of the drug. 
Yet even if this is a serious concern that justifies some government 
action, it doesn’t mean that people lack medical self-defense rights—
rather, it merely points the possibility that these rights may sometimes 
be trumped by a strong enough justification.  Scientific medical testing 
is tremendously important for protecting people’s lives, and one could 
argue that protecting the lives of many in the future should justify jeop-
ardizing the rights and lives of some (by legally denying them access to 
potentially life-saving drugs) today.106 But even if this argument is ac-
cepted, that would give a reason for limiting medical self-defense only 
when such a limitation is really necessary for conducting clinical stud-
ies, and when no other alternatives will do. 
Thus, for instance, if the studies require 200 patients, and there are 
10,000 who seek the experimental therapy, there’s little reason to con-
strain the self-defense rights of all 10,000.  Likewise, if the drug is only 
being studied now on people who suffer from a particular kind or stage 
of a disease, it shouldn’t be legally barred to those who would fall out-
side those studies in any event.  If we really do need to strip people of 
their rights, and deny them something that might save their lives in the 
name of saving many others’ lives in the future, this tragic obligation 
should be imposed on as few people as possible and to as small an extent 
as possible. 
There is of course one difference between Alice and Ellen:  Most life-
threatening complications of pregnancy can be cured quite reliably 
through a therapeutic abortion.  The therapy that Ellen wants is, by 
definition, much more speculative; the chance of recovery may be low, 
 
terminally ill, the government’s interest in protecting this life against the patient’s at-
tempts to lengthen the life is as its weakest. 
105 See, e.g., id. at 35; Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Drug Addiction, NEW REP., July 3, 2006, at 
9. 
106 See, e.g., Emanuel, supra note 105. 
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and may even be impossible to reliably estimate, precisely because the 
therapy is experimental. 
Yet there’s no reason why the right to self-defense should be limited 
to sure self-defense.  Lethal self-defense, after all, is often not com-
pletely reliable; even if Katherine tries to use lethal force, she may be 
overcome by the home invader.  But Katherine nonetheless has this 
right, both because some increase in the chance of survival is better 
than none, and because her autonomy entitles her to protect herself 
without regard to whether the protection is perfect. 
Similarly, imagine a woman who is sure to die without an abortion, 
but who faces only a small chance of survival with an abortion.  Would 
her abortion-as-self-defense right disappear simply because the abortion 
is no longer guaranteed?  I would think not; her situation may be espe-
cially tragic, but even a fairly small (or uncertain) increase in chance of 
survival should suffice for her to retain her rights. 
At most, some people might reach a different result if the fetus is 
likely to survive the woman’s death:  As between a 100% chance of ma-
ternal survival and fetal death and a 100% chance of maternal death 
and fetal survival, they might reason, they would choose allowing the 
woman to abort; but as between a 10% chance of maternal survival cou-
pled with sure fetal death and a 100% chance of fetal survival coupled 
with sure maternal death, they would choose protecting the fetus.  Yet 
even they, I think, would justify this conclusion by saying that the 
woman’s right to self-defense is trumped by the need to protect a viable 
fetus’s life—not by claiming that the woman’s right simply vanishes be-
cause her defensive tactics aren’t certain to succeed. 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abigail Alliance rested in part on the 
traditionally recognized right to defend one’s own life; yet it didn’t cite 
the very close analogy to abortion-as-self-defense, or discuss the state 
constitutional protections for the right to self-defense.  These analogies, 
I think, substantially add to the case the Abigail Alliance panel made.107 
Finally, some might reject these arguments for a constitutional 
right to medical self-defense on the grounds that courts generally ought 
not create constitutional rights.  The right to abortion—even abortion-
as-self-defense—was a mistake, they might argue, and ought not be 
broadened by analogy.  Lethal self-defense ought to be seen as a com-
mon-law or statutory right subject to legislative control rather than as a 
constitutional right.  Let’s stick with judicial minimalism, at least where 
 
107 Abigail Alliance’s response to the government’s petition for rehearing does note 
the abortion analogy, but the Alliance’s lawyer reports that this was based on a blog post 
of mine in which I described this theory.  See Appellants’ Response to Appellees’ Petition 
for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, No. 04-3530 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2006); Tele-
phone Conversation between J. Scott Ballenger and me; Eugene Volokh, Terminally Ill 
Patients’ Right to Get Potentially Life-Saving Medication, http://volokh.com/posts/ 
1146601925.shtml. 
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unenumerated rights are concerned, and leave as much as possible to 
the democratic process. 
This is a plausible argument, but not one the Supreme Court has 
adopted.  Casey v. Planned Parenthood shows that even the most con-
troversial unenumerated right, the right to abortion, remains endorsed 
by the Court.  Troxel v. Granville shows that the Court remains willing 
to protect unenumerated family rights.108 
Lawrence v. Texas shows that the Court is willing not only to pre-
serve unenumerated rights that the Court had already recognized, but 
to recognize new ones.109 Cruzan v. Director, the 1990 case that recog-
nized a “liberty interest . . . in refusing unwanted medical treatment”—
an interest that the Court noted may indeed constrain government ac-
tion, and that was thus tantamount to a presumptive constitutional 
right—shows the same.110 There’s no need to reprise the entire unenu-
merated rights/Ninth Amendment/substantive due process debate here, 
and little profit in so reprising it.  My point is simply that the Court’s 
common-law-like process for recognizing unenumerated rights by anal-
ogy remains active, and so long as it does remain active, there is a 
strong case for using this process to recognize a medical self-defense. 
But even to those who reject a constitutional medical self-defense 
right, the arguments given above should offer a strong ethical case for 
the legislature’s respecting such a right.  American legal traditions 
properly recognize people’s rights to protect their lives, even when that 
requires killing.  The law ought to do the same when a dying person 
simply seeks an opportunity to risk slightly shortening her life in order 
to have the chance of substantially lengthening it. 
V. MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM 
WITH BANS ON PAYMENT FOR ORGANS 
A. The Problem 
To live, Denise needs a kidney transplant.  Kidney dialysis is keep-
ing her alive for now, but it’s far from a sure solution:  If Denise is in 
her twenties, her expected lifespan on dialysis is 30 years less than her 
expected lifespan with a transplant.111 
108 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
109 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
110 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) 
(treating Cruzan as “assum[ing], and strongly suggest[ing], that the Due Process Clause 
protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment”).  Only 
Justice Scalia rejected this view.  497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
111 Akinlolu O. Ojo, Survival in Recipients of Marginal Cadaveric Donor Kidneys 
Compared with Other Recipients and Wait-Listed Transplant Candidates, 12 J. AM. SOC.
NEPHROL. 589, 589 (2001) (“The estimated additional life-years gained from renal trans-
plantation [compared to remaining on dialysis] vary from 8 yr in a diabetic recipient who 
is 60 yr or older to 31 yr in a nondiabetic recipient who is 20 to 44 yr old.”); Robert A. 
Wolfe et al., Comparison of Mortality in All Patients on Dialysis, Patients on Dialysis 
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The trouble is that Denise is one of the 67,000 people on the Ameri-
can kidney transplant waiting lists, and 25,000 more waiting for other 
organs.112 The average wait for adult recipients in 2001-02 was over 
four years.113 Each year, about 6% of the people on the kidney waiting 
list die, despite being on dialysis.114 And each year, only 6500 living 
Americans donate kidneys,115 and only 45% of the 26,000 usable ca-
daveric kidneys—kidneys harvested from the bodies of people who die 
through accidents or other events that leave their organs still young and 
healthy—are actually donated.116 
Nor should this shortage be surprising:  Since 1984, “knowingly ac-
quir[ing], receiv[ing] or otherwise transfer[ing] any human organ for 
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation” has been a 
federal felony.117 Price controls diminish supply; setting the price at 
zero diminishes it dramatically. 
Lack of compensation naturally makes living donors less likely to 
incur the pain, modest risk, lost time, and lost wages that accompany 
the extraction of an organ.118 The relatives of the recently dead have 
less to lose tangibly from authorizing the extraction of the decedent’s 
organs; but even they may be put off by what strikes many as a macabre 
 
Awaiting Transplantation, and Recipients of a First Cadaveric Transplant, 341 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1725 (1999) (reporting that “[t]he long-term mortality rate was 48 to 82 percent 
lower among transplant recipients . . . than patients on the waiting list, with relatively 
larger benefits among patients who were 20 to 39 year old, white patients, and younger 
patients with diabetes”); Charlotte Medin et al., Survival of Patients Who Have Been on a 
Waiting List for Renal Transplantation, 15 NEPHROL. DIAL. TRANSPLANT 701 (2000).  Im-
mediate transplantation, without long-term dialysis, also appears to lead to better trans-
plant survival than does transplantation after dialysis.  See Kevin C. Mange et al., Effect 
of the Use or Nonuse of Long-Term Dialysis on the Subsequent Survival of Renal Trans-
plants from Living Donors, 344 N. ENGL. J. MED. 726 (2001). 
112 See Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (category Waiting List, count Candidates, report 
Overall by Organ) (based on data as of Aug. 11, 2006) (reporting that people are waiting in 
the U.S. for 67,000 kidneys, 17,000 livers, 1700 pancreases, 2500 kidney/pancreas combi-
nations, 2900 hearts, 2900 lungs, 150 heart/lung combinations, and 230 intestines).  The 
data does not include people waiting for bone marrow transplants or skin transplants. 
113 See Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (category Median Waiting Time, organ Kidney, 
report Waiting Time by Age). 
114 See Wolfe, supra note 111, at 1725. 
115 See Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (category Donor, organ Kidney, report Living 
Donors By Donor Age). 
116 See infra note 185. 
117 National Organ Transfer Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006).  The statute applies only 
“if the transfer affects interstate commerce,” but under modern law such provisions are in-
terpreted very broadly, and would likely cover any sale of an organ.  A minority of states 
have also adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987, which bars sales of cadaveric 
organs for transplant.  UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a) (1987) (“A person may not 
knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchase or sell a part for transplantation or ther-
apy, if removal of the part is intended to occur after the death of the decedent.”). 
118 See LLOYD R. COHEN, INCREASING THE SUPPLY OF TRANSPLANT ORGANS: THE VIR-
TUES OF AN OPTIONS MARKET 25-29 (1995). 
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idea, may be likely to err on the side of refusing consent if they’re not 
sure what the decedent wanted,119 or may not want to even discuss the 
matter in their time of grief.120 The prospect of (say) $100,000 for the 
children’s college education may lead them to overcome these psycho-
logical barriers.121 
Some people, of course, do donate organs.  Such donations are usu-
ally for relatives, friends, or some other known recipients, when there‘s 
a tissue match.122 But a few people also donate anonymously to strang-
ers. 
Yet kindness to strangers is generally not as strong as motivation as 
the desire for some financial reward (or perhaps a combination of the 
desire to help strangers and at the same time to put money aside for 
your children’s education).  We pay hospitals and transplant doctors 
handsomely for their part in the transplant.  If we didn’t, there’d likely 
not be nearly enough transplant services provided, even though many 
hospitals are charitable institutions and many doctors routinely donate 
their time to free medical care.123 Why should we expect that organ 
suppliers would provide an adequate number of organs based solely on 
charity?124 
119 See, e.g., Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors Influencing Families’ Consent for Dona-
tion of Solid Organs for Transplantation, 286 JAMA 71, 74 (2001) (noting that families 
were significantly more likely to approve a transplant if they “had enough information re-
garding [the decedent’s] donation wishes”). 
120 Similarly, people who don’t sign a donor card may be turned off because ofemo-
tional concerns, though far less intense ones.  See, e.g., Hansmann, infra note 170, at 67 
(noting people’s “slight distaste for considering the subject”); COHEN, supra note 118, at 
25-26.  The prospect of essentially getting a free (though modest) life insurance policy for 
one’s relatives may be enough to help overcome this slight distaste. Id. 
121 I draw the number $100,000 from Crespi, supra note 36, at 44, who suggested—
based on a pretty detailed analysis—that $30,000 would be a plausible price for each ma-
jor organ; I then assume that some but not all the potentially transplantable organs will 
indeed be used and paid for.  Professor Crespi was speaking of the price needed to sustain 
a futures market, in which people are paid a modest sum ($200) during their lives for the 
right to extract their organs at death, and I speak instead mostly of payment to the next of 
kin at time of death; but my sense is that Professor Crespi’s arguments make $30,000 a 
plausible back-of-the-envelope estimate for the price of an organ in either case. 
122 See Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (category Transplant, organ All, report Living 
Donor Transplants by Donor Relation) (reporting data showing that in 2005, 76% of dona-
tions were to relatives or spouses, 21% were other directed but nonanonymous donations, 
<1% were donation exchanges, <1% were unknown, and only 1.3% were known to be 
purely anonymous donations to strangers). 
123 See Peter J. Cunningham & Jessica H. May, A Growing Hole in the Safety Net: 
Physician Charity Care Declines Again, Center for Studying Health System Change, 
Tracking Report No. 13, Mar. 2006, http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/826/ (estimating  
that American doctors in full-time nonfederal practice—excluding residents and fellows—
spend over 6% of their practice time on charity care). 
124 Even people who have nothing tangible to lose from an organ donation—relatives 
of the recently dead—often decline to donate, see infra note 185, presumably because when 
one gets no benefit other than the satisfaction of charity towards strangers, even a small 
emotional cost (stemming from the perceived macabreness or insensitivity of the donation 
request) can lead people to say no. 
58405-TEXT.NATIVE.1160778656 10/13/2006 3:32:52 PM 
32 VOLOKH [October 13, 2006 
Denise, as I have suggested, is little different from Alice.  To defend 
their lives, both need medical assistance.  If the government may not in-
terfere with Alice’s getting medical assistance, even in the service of 
protecting the life of a viable fetus, then it shouldn’t be allowed to sub-
stantially restrict Denise’s ability to get such assistance—at least ab-
sent some evidence that Denise’s actions would cause grave harm that 
can’t be averted in any other way. 
B. Limits on Sales as Substantial Burdens 
The organ sales ban doesn’t expressly ban transplants:  It bans peo-
ple from being paid for organs (such as kidneys) transplanted during the 
provider’s life, and it bans providers’ estates from being paid for organs 
(hearts, kidneys, and more) transplanted after the provider’s death.  Re-
cipients may not pay the providers; neither may anyone else—if Bill 
Gates and Warren Buffett decided to contribute a billion dollars to pay 
providers’ estates $10,000 per donated organ,125 that transaction would 
still be a felony:  It would involve organ providers’ “transfer[ing a] hu-
man organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplanta-
tion,” the hospitals’ “acquir[ing or] receiv[ing]” such an organ, and 
Gates’ and Buffett’s conspiring with the providers and the hospitals to 
do so. 
So though this restriction isn’t a total transplant ban, it is a sub-
stantial obstacle126 to people’s exercise of their medical self-defense 
rights.  It substantially reduces the number of available organs.  It sub-
stantially decreases the chance that there’ll be an available organ that 
matches the recipient’s tissue.  And it substantially increases the 
chance that the recipient will die before a match is found. 
Where most other constitutional rights are concerned, this point—
that bans on using money to help exercise a right are substantial bur-
dens on the right—is so obvious that we rarely discuss it.  Say, for in-
stance, that a legislature allowed abortions (whether post-viability abor-
tions-as-self-defense or pre-viability abortions-as-reproductive-choice) to 
be performed only by doctors who volunteer their services.  Perhaps the 
rationale would be that, even if a woman must have the right to kill her 
future child, it is immoral or socially corrosive for people to earn money 
from such killing, or for an industry to arise that is devoted to such kill-
ing.127 
125 Cf. Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ Do-
nation, 265 JAMA 1302 (1991) (proposing a $1000 payment, which would likewise be felo-
nious under the current system, and taking the view that such a payment will provide a 
substantial incentive). 
126 Cf. Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (concluding that to be a 
presumptively unconstitutional undue burden on abortion rights, a law must set up a 
“substantial obstacle” to exercise those rights). 
127 Cf. Abortion Veto, NEWSHOUR WITH JIM LEHRER, Apr. 11, 1996 (quoting Rep. Chris 
Smith condemning “the abortion industry, a multimillion dollar industry that is making 
its money by killing babies [through late-term abortions]”). 
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Surely we would agree that this creates a substantial burden on 
abortion rights.  Though some doctors may indeed provide their services 
for free, the payment ban would dramatically reduce the number of 
abortion providers and the time the providers would be willing to spend 
on performing abortions.  Some women would thus be unable to get 
abortions, or would have to wait a long time (perhaps past the point of 
viability) to get them.  If a ban on one scarce input into the exercise of a 
constitutional right (doctors’ time) is a substantial burden on the right, 
then a ban on another scarce input (providers’ organs) should be as well. 
Likewise, a requirement that contraceptives be distributed only for 
free would obviously burden people’s right to use contraceptives.  A re-
quirement that all private lawyers appear in criminal trials for free 
would obviously burden people’s right to assistance of counsel.128 A law 
that barred parents from paying private school tuition or barred the 
private schools from paying salaries to teachers—thus essentially re-
quiring the schools to operate strictly using volunteer teaching provid-
ers, just as the organ donation system now must use volunteer organ 
providers—would substantially and unconstitutionally burden the right 
to private education.  Such restrictions would so clearly make a mockery 
of the rights, and would so clearly create a substantial obstacle to their 
exercise, that to my knowledge they haven’t even been tried. 
The one area where courts have squarely confronted limits on the 
payment of money as part of the exercise of constitutional rights is the 
Free Speech Clause.  And here, courts have held that such payment lim-
its are presumptively unconstitutional. 
A publisher, for instance, may not be barred from paying money to 
authors, because that would substantially burden the publisher’s ability 
to procure the authors’ speech, and thus substantially interfere with the 
publisher’s own speech.129 A ballot measure campaign may not be 
barred from paying money to signature gatherers.130 Speakers who 
want to advocate for or against a candidate or a ballot measure are enti-
tled to spend their money to do so.131 People who want to contribute 
 
128 See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1989) 
(noting that “the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be represented by 
an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire,” though uphold-
ing pretrial forfeiture of allegedly ill-gotten funds—including funds that the defendant 
wanted to use to pay his lawyer—because “A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to 
spend another person’s money,” and the forfeited funds are treated as not being rightfully 
defendant’s).  Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985), up-
held a $10 limit on what a veteran may pay a lawyer who represents the veteran in Veter-
ans Administration proceedings, but only because there’s no constitutional right to counsel 
in such proceedings in the first place, id. at 323-24, 332, 334-35. 
129 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 
(1991). 
130 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
131 First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976). 
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money to ideological causes have a constitutional right to do so.132 Even 
limits on paying government employees for their off-the-job speech are 
presumptively unconstitutional, though they may sometimes be upheld 
if the government acting as employer can show that such payments dis-
rupt the government’s operation.133 
The two spending limits that the Court has upheld are the limits on 
giving money to a political candidate,134 and on corporate spending in 
support of or opposition to a political candidate.135 Yet the Court upheld 
these limits only after concluding that the limits imposed only a modest 
burden on free speech rights—because the contributor remained free to 
express his views by spending the money directly or by pooling re-
sources with others but independently of the candidate, and the corpo-
ration remained free to speak through a segregated fund—and because 
there were very strong government interests justifying these modest 
burdens.136 
Some constitutional rights may be protected because they promote 
values that are served only by noncommercial exercise of the rights.  
Sexual autonomy is likely one example:  Though consenting adults are 
entitled to have sex with each other, they likely aren’t entitled to pay for 
that sex.137 But this is so because the purpose of the sexual autonomy 
right is to let people develop emotional relationships,138 and buying sex 
for cash in hand seems unlikely to lead to an emotional connection.  
(The sexual autonomy right may incidentally protect purely recreational 
sex, but that’s a side effect of the broader purpose, and of the law’s usual 
inability to distinguish recreational noncommercial sex from emotion-
ally significant noncommercial sex.) 
The ban on buying sex thus doesn’t substantially burden the sexual 
autonomy right, because bought sex isn’t constitutionally valuable in 
the way that unbought sex is.  Likewise, the Compulsory Process Clause 
right to subpoena witnesses and the Due Process Clause right to call 
willing witnesses in criminal cases139 don’t allow the defendant to pay 
percipient witnesses for their testimony.  But this is likewise because 
bought testimony is seen as unreliable and thus not constitutionally 
valuable in the way that unbought testimony is. 
 
132 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240 (1959). 
133 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
134 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976). 
135 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
136 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659, 660; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28, 29. 
137 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); State v. Freitag, 130 P.3d 544, 
546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); People v.Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004); State v. 
Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233 (La. 2005). 
138 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566; Commonwealth v. Walter, 446 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Mass. 
1983); Carolyn J. Frantz, Should The Rules of Marital Property Be Normative?, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEG. F. 265, 287. 
139 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
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But paid-for books, private school educations, legal counsel, abor-
tions, and contraceptives are fully constitutionally valuable, because 
they serve the purposes of the underlying constitutional rights.  So it is 
with the paid-for organ, which will save a person’s life as surely as a do-
nated organ.140 In fact, these paid-for products or services serve the 
purposes of the rights more often, and more reliably, than if these goods 
or services were provided for free.  “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest.”141 Likewise, relying solely on the 
benevolence of others, whether lawyers, doctors, teachers, or organ pro-
viders, offers little protection for our rights. 
Of course, the right involved remains the right not to have substan-
tial governmental burdens imposed on one’s ability to protect one’s life 
through medical care.  It’s not a “right to pay for organs,” just as the 
right to get an abortion when needed for self-defense is not a “right to a 
postviability abortion,” much less a “right to postviability dilation and 
extraction procedure.”  Rather, bans on organ sales are presumptively 
unconstitutional only because they substantially burden people’s ability 
to engage medical self-defense. 
If some technical or social change allowed all people with failing or-
gans to protect their lives without having organ suppliers compen-
sated—for instance, if a mechanical kidney became as effective as a 
transplanted kidney, or if cadaveric organ donation became so popular 
(without compensation) that the waiting lists were cleared off—then the 
ban on such compensation would stop being a substantial burden.  
Likewise, if some new medical procedure protected a pregnant woman’s 
life just as well as an abortion of the viable fetus would, then the woman 
need not be allowed to get the abortion.  But so long as a ban on pay-
ment for organs (or a ban on postviability abortions) jeopardizes a pa-
tient’s life, the patient should be presumptively entitled to defend his 
life notwithstanding the ban. 
C. Reasons To Limit the Right? 
While I’ve stressed the importance of self-defense, I’ve acknowl-
edged that this right, like others, isn’t absolute.  Modest regulations (in-
formed consent requirements, waiting periods, and the like) that don’t 
substantially interfere with the right should be permissible.  The scope 
of the right may well be limited to situations where self-defense is genu-
inely necessary to avoid threat of death, or perhaps threat of very seri-
ous injury.  The right is also inherently limited to situations where it 
 
140 While the charitable impulse behind an organ donation (or pro bono provision of 
education, or of abortion services) may give both the donor and the recipient extra gratifi-
cation, this is peripheral to the core constitutional value that the right to medical self-
defense (or private education or abortion) protects. 
141 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 18 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776). 
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doesn’t directly infringe the rights of others who are not threatening the 
person’s life.142 
Moreover, the self-defense right may be limitable in other ways, if 
the harm from allowing it is too great; in the lethal self-defense context, 
for instance, this is the foundation for many pro-gun-control arguments.  
While I’m skeptical of these arguments on empirical grounds, and while 
I think that it should take a great deal of harm to justify interfering 
with people’s right to defend themselves, I agree that in principle the 
right to possess the tools for lethal self-defense may be limitable.  To 
give one example, felons may need to defend themselves at least as 
much as nonfelons; yet I agree that restrictions on felons’ gun ownership 
are constitutional and morally permissible.143 Likewise, the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Abigail Alliance remanded the case so that the district court 
could hear arguments about whether the FDA rules were narrowly tai-
lored to a compelling government interest.144 
Yet, as the abortion-as-self-defense and lethal self-defense examples 
show, self-defense ought only be limitable for the most pressing of rea-
sons.  Protecting a viable fetus isn’t enough.  Protecting the life of an 
animal isn’t enough.  Protecting the life of an attacker, even one who’s 
not morally culpable (for instance, because he’s insane) isn’t enough.  All 
these reasons can’t justify denying people the right to protect their own 
lives. 
And even if there is a pressing reason for restricting self-defense 
rights, the restriction ought to be narrowly limited to minimize the bur-
den on self-defense.145 For instance, the risk that self-defense would be 
falsely pled, so as to mask a murder, is a serious risk.  The risk may 
well justify certain procedural devices that may constrain people’s le-
gitimate self-defense rights:  The government may, for instance, make 
self-defense an affirmative defense, and perhaps even one that must be 
proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence (which will 
foreseeably lead to the erroneous conviction of some people who were 
genuinely acting in self-defense).146 
But the legal system must still resolve self-defense claims on a case-
by-case basis, even though resolving them by flatly rejecting self-defense 
as a defense may be a more efficient tool for preventing murders cloaked 
 
142 See supra text accompanying note 48. 
143 See, e.g., People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975). 
144 Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 486. 
145 Cf., e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990) (holding that where the 
constitutional right to free speech is involved, restrictions must be as narrow as possible). 
146 The Court so held in Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987), though without consider-
ing whether there’s a substantive constitutional right to self-defense.  I’m not sure that 
this result is correct, or that such a regime is morally proper even if it’s constitutionally 
permissible; and my misgivings fit with the laws in the forty-nine states that do not im-
pose such a burden on defendants, supra note 76.  Yet I agree that some burdens on de-
fendants, for instance placing the burden of production on them, or even requiring the 
government to rebut the affirmative defense of self-defense by mere clear and convincing 
evidence, may be permissible (or at least it’s a close call whether they are permissible). 
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as self-defense.  Some sacrifice of the interest in preventing murder of 
people who are falsely claimed to be attackers must yield to the consti-
tutional and moral interest in preventing murder (or rape or serious in-
jury) of people who are truly being attacked.  In my view, even if there 
are some good reasons to substantially restrict organ sales in ways that 
may interfere with medical self-defense rights, those reasons can’t jus-
tify anything close to the flat ban on sales that we have now. 
1. Preventing Commodification 
One reason often given for banning organ sales is preventing com-
modification:  “[T]he integrity of the human body should never be sub-
ject to trade,”147 or because, like “a desired legal  verdict, a Pulitzer 
Price, or a child,” organs are good that “have a meaning and value that 
places them outside the market.”148 In the words of leading conserva-
tive bioethicist Leon Kass (a University of Chicago Professor and for 
three years the chair of the President’s Council on Bioethics), 
The idea of commodification of human flesh repels us, quite prop-
erly I would say, because we sense that the human body especially be-
longs in that category of things that defy or resist commensuration—
like love or friendship or life itself. . . .  [T]he bulk of [these things’] 
meaning and their human worth do not lend themselves to quantitative 
measures; for this reason, we hold them to be commensurable, not only 
morally but factually. . . . 
. . .
[C]ommodification by conventional commensuration [through mar-
ket exchange] always risks the homogenization of worth, and even the 
homogenization of things, all under the aspect of quantity.  In many 
transactions, we do not mind or suffer or even notice.  Yet the human 
soul finally rebels against the principle, whenever it strikes closest to 
home. . . . 
. . .
We surpass all defensible limits of such conventional commodifica-
tion when we contemplate making the convention-maker—the human 
being—just another one of the commensurables.  Selling our bodies, we 
come perilously close to selling out our souls.  There is even a danger in 
contemplating such a prospect—for if we come to think about ourselves 
like pork bellies, pork bellies we will become.149 
147 Ignazio R. Marino et al., Market of Organs Is Unethical Under Any Circumstances,
325 BMJ 835 (2002) (formerly the British Medical Journal); see also Human Organ Trans-
plantation: A Report on Developments Under the Auspices of WHO, 42 INT’L DIG. OF 
HEALTH LEG. 389, 393 (1991) (simply asserting that “The human body and its parts can-
not be the subject of commercial transactions,” with no detailed justification). 
148 C.J. Dougherty, Body Futures: The Case Against Marketing Human Organs, 68 
HEALTH PROG. 512-53, June 1987. 
149 See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Organs for Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price of Pro-
gress, 107 PUB. INT. 65, 81-83 (1992) (emphasis added); Murray, infra note 178, at 115-18.  
Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987), is the classic legal 
work on preventing commodification as a justification for rules barring sales of certain 
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Yet once one sets aside the vivid imagery, Professor Kass’s analysis 
strikes me as quite unpersuasive.  It’s true that some things “defy” 
sales, such as love or friendship; but this is because sold love just isn’t 
“love” as we define the term.  A kidney is still a kidney, just as a kidney 
transplant operation is still a kidney transplant operation, whether pro-
vided for money or for free.  In either case, it has the same meaning and 
human worth—it can save a human life. 
Nor is compensation for providing kidneys morally similar to selling 
“the human being.”  We generally condemn selling humans because it 
involves slavery and violent control of the unwilling slaves.  Even volun-
tary slavery, we suspect, would involve misery and degradation for the 
living person who is selling himself into slavery, because it would sub-
ject him to the new master’s despotic control.  And even the least slave-
like of human sales—the selling of children to adoptive parents—risks 
harm to an unconsenting living human. 
None of these concerns apply to paid transplants.  When an organ is 
taken from a cadaver, the organ’s source is dead.  The death may be a 
tragedy, but there’s no selling out of the soul in using the organs, 
whether the organs are paid for or not.  The soul has fled, and what is 
left is a cadaver to be buried, plus precious organs that can save living 
soulbearers’ lives. 
Likewise, when an organ is provided by a living person, it is the or-
gan being provided, not the soul (just as when an organ is provided for 
free, it is the organ being given away, not the soul).  The noblest of la-
bor—the work of a surgeon, a teacher, a nanny—is often sold, without 
being degraded, or without the laborer’s soul being sold.  Great art is 
sold, without being degraded.  And more of these noble services or goods 
become available precisely because they can be sold.  That an organ 
provider is paid money doesn’t jeopardize his soul any more than the 
doctor’s soul is jeopardized by his being paid money for performing the 
operation. 
But I don’t want to go into more detail about this here.  Others have 
responded to the commodification argument at length;150 yet such re-
sponses have limited persuasiveness.  The anticommodification claim 
may be at bottom a philosophical and spiritual axiom—a premise for an 
argument rather than a conclusion.  Leon Kass’s vision of the human 
soul rebels against payment for transplants.  “writes:  “[T]he human 
soul finally rebels against the principle [of homogenization of worth] 
whenever it strikes closest to home, ” for instance “when we contemplate 
making the convention-maker—the human being—just another one of 
the commensurables.”151 My human soul rebels against price controls 
that limit the supply of transplantable organs and thus cause people to 
 
goods or services; but Professor Radin doesn’t take a stand on whether the commodifica-
tion objection should apply to organ sales, id. at 1855 n.23. 
150 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 118, at 68-76; Hansmann, infra note 170, at 74-78. 
151 Kass, supra note 2, at 82-83. 
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die needlessly.   At the level of a soul’s rebellion, argument can only go 
so far. 
But I think that the presence of a constitutional and moral right—a 
constitutional and moral right that justifies both defensive abortions 
and defensive use of lethal force—ought to resolve such an impasse.  
Philosophical preferences such as Professor Kass’s suffice to justify a 
law under the rational basis test; but where a constitutional right is in-
volved, something more demonstrably compelling must be required. 
Some people may believe that killing innocent fetuses is immoral, 
even when done defensively, or that killing criminal attackers is im-
moral.  They may think that society would benefit from promoting a cul-
ture of life that is so deep and uncompromising that it never allows peo-
ple to use deadly force against viable fetuses or born humans.152 Yet the 
premise of the abortion-as-self-defense component of Roe and Casey is 
that such moral and attitude-molding concerns can’t justify limiting 
people’s abortion-as-self-defense rights.  The same should go for medical 
self-defense more broadly. 
2. Equalizing Access for Rich Recipients and Poor Recipients 
Organs are now allocated based on a combination of the patient’s 
medical need and the patient’s ability to get relatives or friends to pro-
vide a directed organ donation.  Paying for organs, the argument goes, 
would instead let rich patients (even relatively low-need ones) buy up all 
the available organs, and leave high-need poor or middle-class patients 
without the chance of a transplant.153 Therefore we should maintain 
our current donation-only system. 
Yet even if letting rich people get more access to organs is unfair, 
the “therefore” doesn’t follow.  A donation-only system doesn’t just keep 
the rich from cutting in line.  It also prevents everyone—including in-
surance companies and charities—from paying for organs that would go 
into the existing need-based system, and that would save more lives 
within that system. 
Organs aren’t plug-and-play:  Organ transplants are complex, ex-
pensive procedures, with expensive post-operative care.  They are al-
ready available only to those who are rich, who have health insurance, 
or who have government-provided health care.154 
Moreover, kidney transplants are actually about $100,000 less ex-
pensive (if you don’t count the prospective organ cost) than long-term 
dialysis.  This means that those health plans, private or governmental, 
 
152 Cf. Aaron Fortune, Violence as Self-Sacrifice: Creative Pacifism in a Violent World,
18 J. SPECUL. PHIL. 184, 189 (2004) (endorsing violence in certain situations, but generally 
rejecting the principle that self-defense can itself justify violence). 
153 See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 148, at 53 (making this as an argument against 
organ sales); Gorovitz, infra note 172, at 11 (likewise); COHEN, supra note 118, at 56-64 
(discussing and criticizing this argument). 
154 Hansmann, infra note 170, at 80. 
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that pay for the organs could save money by paying up to $100,000 per 
kidney.  If they were allowed to do that, (1) they likely would do that, (2) 
such a payment would likely substantially increase the pool of available 
organs, and (3) the organs could still be distributed through the same 
need-based system we have today.  Even if InsuranceForTheRichCorp 
saves money by paying $80,000 per kidney, this needn’t give its rich 
policyholders any leg up over policyholders for other companies, since 
the other companies would be willing to pay the same amount.  So there 
could still be rules mandating that organs be distributed to the patients 
with the greatest medical need; there would just be more organs to be 
distributed, since each received organ would be paid for. 
Even if for some organ, transplants wouldn’t save money, and the 
insurance company would have to pay an extra $30,000 per organ to 
compensate providers,155 this will hardly be a huge burden for compa-
nies to absorb.  Each year, about 15,000-20,000 Americans are added to 
transplant waiting lists; even if that number doubles once organs be-
comes more available, that would still only constitute about .015% of the 
250 million Americans with health insurance.156 If each organ cost 
$30,000, and this price wasn’t offset by any savings in alternative 
treatment costs, this would mean an increase in insurance costs of $5 
per year per insured. 
The “rich outbidding others” concern only arises if (1) the rich or 
their insurance companies pay so much that other health care funders 
can’t match this, and (2) the payments the other funders offer don’t suf-
fice to make enough organs available.  Even if we think this is likely—if 
we think that the rich would pay $200,000 per kidney, other health care 
funders wouldn’t pay any more than $100,000 per kidney, and at this 
$100,000 payment there still wouldn’t be enough organs available for 
everyone—this at most counsels in favor of a cap on payments, not a to-
tal ban.  (The cap would be set at the level that pretty much all the 
health care funders would pay, perhaps because even at that level 
they’ll be saving money by getting the kidney rather than paying for 
long-term dialysis.) 
So the ban on payment for organs is not the least restrictive means 
of preventing the rich from having more access to organs; a (fairly high) 
cap on payments would maintain equality while imposing less of a bur-
den on patients’ self-defense rights. 
 
155 See Crespi, supra note 36, at 44 (suggesting that $30,000 would be a plausible 
price for each major organ). 
156 See Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (category Waiting List Additions, organ All, 
count Candidates, report Waiting List Additions by Age); Organ Procurement & Trans-
plantation Network, http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (category Waiting List Ad-
ditions, organ Kidney, count Candidates, report Waiting List Additions by Age); U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, Income Stable, Poverty Rate Increases, Percentage of Americans Without 
Health Insurance Unchanged, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/005647.html. 
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Of course, even this lesser burden may still be a substantial burden, 
if the capped payment leaves some people on the organ waiting list.   
And this burden may well be improper if we conclude that preventing 
inequality isn’t a strong enough reason to interfere with medical self-
defense.  Where other rights are concerned, we generally don’t let the 
government impose such payment caps.  The rich, for instance, can send 
their children to schools that the poor can’t afford, though this increases’ 
rich children’s competitive advantage over poor children.157 If the gov-
ernment wants to deal with this inequality, it must do so by spending 
money, either on public schools or on school choice programs—it must 
level people up by spending, not level them down by banning. 
Likewise, the rich can spend their money to express their views, or 
to start churches, even though the poor can’t.  Even those who would 
limit paid-for speech about candidates or ballot measures would still 
leave any rich person with the right to buy a newspaper, and thus leave 
the rich with far greater influence than the poor or middle-class would 
have.158 
The same also applies when people’s life or liberty is on the line.  A 
rich defendant who’s facing the death penalty or life in prison can hire a 
better lawyer than a poor defendant can; what’s more, this right may 
decrease the availability of top lawyers to the poor and the middle-class.  
A requirement that all criminal defense lawyers charge the same low 
fixed rate would make things more equal, but it would violate the cli-
ents’ constitutional rights. 
The rich people may also hire bodyguards to protect their lives; poor 
people can’t, and middle-class people might find it too expensive because 
the rich in some measure bid up the prices.  Rich patients who want ex-
perimental procedures that health insurance doesn’t cover, or who want 
top doctors who charge more than health insurance will reimburse, 
aren’t barred from spending their own money, even though this means 
that the rich are more likely to save their lives than the poor.159 
157 See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, The Devil Is in the Details: Or, Why I Haven’t Yet 
Learned To Stop Worrying and Love Vouchers, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 483 
(2003) (noting that the constitutional right to send one’s child to a private school helps 
“ensure that the children of relatively wealthy and powerful parents will have an educa-
tional leg up on everyone else”). 
158 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (exempting the institutional media from various 
campaign finance rules). 
159 Concerns about this disparity have led, in some countries, to bans on the private 
payment for some medical procedures.  Cf. Colleen M. Flood, Mark. Stabile & Carolyn 
Hughes Tuohy, The Borders of Solidarity: How Countries Determine the Public/Private 
Mix in Spending and the Impact on Health Care, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 297, 306-07 (2002) 
(reporting that Quebec had banned private health insurance for services that fell within 
the public health insurance plan); Physicians for a National Health Program, Single-Payer 
FAQ, http://www.pnhp.org/facts/singlepayer_faq.php (asking “Why shouldn’t we let people 
buy better health care if they can afford it?” and responding that “Whenever we allow the 
wealthy to buy better care or jump the queue, health care for the rest of us suffers”).  But 
there seems to be little prospect that the United States will accept such an approach. 
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Part of the reason for all this is a general respect for property 
rights—notwithstanding the inequality that property rights necessarily 
cause—and the view that substantive rights (the right to educate one’s 
children, the right to speak, the right to get an abortion, the right to 
hire a lawyer) include the right to spend one’s money to exercise the 
right.  And part is the economic principle that there’ll be much less pro-
vision of valuable services, such as education, legal assistance, protec-
tion against crime, and medical care, if those services must be provided 
for free or subject to a price cap.  Equality that is achieved by leveling 
everyone down to the same low level of protection is generally not a 
worthwhile equality.  In the organ transplant context, it proves for 
many to be the equality of the graveyard. 
Nonetheless, perhaps I’m wrong:  Perhaps the interest in making 
sure that the rich get no preferential access to organs is strong enough 
to trump the medical self-defense right, and this would therefore justify 
barring rich patients from paying extra for such organs.  But this equal-
ity interest can justify only a cap on payments to organ providers, not 
the much more burdensome total ban on such payments. 
3. Preventing Murders Committed To Harvest Organs 
My friend’s cousin’s hairdresser’s father woke up one morning in a 
tub filled with ice, missing both his kidneys:  He had been drugged by 
organ thieves, who then extracted the kidneys and sold them on the 
black market.  True story! 
Usually that’s just repeated as a macabre tale, but it may well be 
what comes to many people’s minds when they hear about organ 
sales.160 And while there’s no reason to think that this particular inci-
dent ever happened,161 we may worry that allowing unlimited organ 
sales may lead to forcible dismemberment and often murder.162 
Yet this concern should no more lead us to ban all organ sales than 
a concern about self-defense claims cloaking murder should lead us to 
categorically repeal the self-defense defense.  Rather, if the forced dis-
memberment risk can be nearly eliminated while imposing a much 
lesser burden on legitimate medical self-defense, we should use that less 
restrictive approach instead of the total sales ban. 
A simple protocol should work:  Require all organs to be initially 
sold to a hospital or some other well-established institution.  If a living 
 
160 See Mike Holloway, The Campaign Against Organ Donation, http://www.classkids. 
org/library/holloway.htm; United States Information Agency, The “Baby Parts” Myth: The 
Anatomy of a Rumor, May 1996, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive_Index/The_Baby_Parts_Myth.html. 
161 See, e.g., http://www.snopes.com/horrors/robbery/kidney.asp, debunking this story, 
though noting that there apparently had been a kidney theft scam, though not outright 
forcible robbery, see India Holds 10 in Plot to Steal Kidneys, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1998, at 
A8. 
162 See Dougherty, supra note 148, at 53; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, infra 
note 188, at 51. 
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person provides the organ, require that the provider sign a document 
before a notary or even a government official.  If the organ is extracted 
from a cadaver, require that the decedent’s relatives do the same.  If 
necessary, bar the importation of organs from countries where we think 
these rules can’t be properly followed.  To make sure that no stolen or-
gans are passed off as a willing provider’s, take and securely store the 
provider’s blood sample so that the organs’ DNA can be matched against 
the provider’s.  Require all organ transfers after the extraction to be 
properly tracked, and done among well-established institutions.163 
Each organ, after all, is likely to be worth only $10,000-$50,000.164 
All of them put together are unlikely to be worth more than $100,000.  
It should be the very rare American medical institution—and even the 
very rare individual American doctor—that would conspire to murder, 
and face the legal risks involved in such a conspiracy, for the sake of 
that amount of money, especially when the providers are closely 
tracked.  And allowing a regulated market in organs may help dry up 
the existing illicit international black market in organs, a market that 
exists in large part because dying people find themselves unable to buy 
organs legally.165 
Of course, despite this, a murder might some day happen despite 
the regulations of the market.  But preventing such murders isn’t, I 
think, reason enough to maintain a system that causes 8000 deaths a 
year through lack of available organs.166 
This still leaves the risk that heirs, to whom $100,000 might be 
worth more than to a hospital, would be tempted to kill a spouse, par-
ent, or child to sell off the organs.  But grisly as the prospect might be, it 
would just be a comparatively rare special case of the existing tempta-
tion to kill a relative to collect life insurance, or to inherit property. 
The median net worth of American families in which the family 
head is 45 or older is over $150,000;167 a considerable fraction of that 
likely passes to heirs when both parents die.  The average American life 
insurance policyholder has about $150,000 worth of coverage.168 Some 
people do kill their relatives to get their hands on this money.169 
Yet we don’t ban life insurance, or ban inheritance, because we real-
ize that even some small risk of providing an incentive to murder isn’t 
 
163 See, e.g., Crespi, supra note 36, at 47 (describing a similar proposal). 
164 See, e.g., id. at 44.  
165 See, e.g., Brian Handwerk, Organ Shortage Fuels Illicit Trade in Human Parts,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC ULTIMATE EXPLORER, Jan. 16, 2004, http://news.nationalgeographic. 
com/news/2004/01/0116_040116_EXPLorgantraffic.html; Peters, supra note 125, at 1303. 
166 See supra note 114. 
167 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 476 
(2001 data). 
168 AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2005, at 84. 
169 See Kenneth Faig, The Murder of the Insured by the Beneficiary: Attempting to 
Quantify One Moral Hazard Relating to Life Insurance Contracts, 21 J. INS. REG. no. 3, at 
3 (Spring 2003).   
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enough to justify interfering with families’ economic well-being—and 
neither should it be enough to interfere with organ recipients’ ability to 
protect their lives.  In all these cases, we rely on the criminal law to de-
ter the murder (and such deterrence is quite likely, since the greedy 
relatives know that they’ll be among the first suspects).170 The same 
should apply if a decedent’s estate were to be increased in some measure 
by the salability of his organs.171 
4. Undue Pressure to Hurt One’s Health by Selling Organs 
Allowing organ sales is supposed to provide an incentive to donate 
organs.  Could it provide too much of an incentive, and put undue pres-
sure on people, especially poor people, to put their health and their lives 
at risk?172 
All major surgery carries with it some risk.  Giving a kidney carries 
a 0.03% risk of death or irreversible coma, a less than 2% risk of compli-
cations,173 and some unknown but not high increase in susceptibility to 
some kidney diseases—the second kidney is nature’s backup, and some-
 
170 This analysis should also respond to the danger that the prospect of leaving more 
money to one’s family will increase the risk of suicide (either by a relatively healthy adult, 
or by someone who’s already terminally ill but who wants to die early to maximize the 
chance that his organs will be transplantable).  See Henry Hansmann, The Economics and 
Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57, 65 (1989).  These 
risks are even more present with inheritance and with life insurance, which often involves 
sums that are much greater than the value of a person’s organs.  (Many life insurance 
policies don’t have suicide exclusions, especially when the suicide happens more than two 
years after the policy is bought.  See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE 
LAW 482, 506 (1988).)  Yet we quite rightly don’t ban insurance or inheritance, or return to 
the practice of forfeiting the property of suicides, because we don’t believe in deterring sui-
cide at all costs—the economic well-being of the decedent’s family suffices to justify poli-
cies that do increase the risk of suicide.  This should be even more true with organ sales, 
which help the decedent’s family, help save recipients’ lives, and help vindicate the recipi-
ents’ self-defense rights. 
171 If we really worry about the risk of murder by relatives, we can further decrease 
it—though not eliminate it—by barring sales of cadaveric organs from decedents killed by 
unknown assailants. 
172 See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 148, at 53; Marino et al. supra note 149, at 835; 
Stephen J. Wigmore et al., 325 BMJ 835 (2002); Samuel Gorovitz, Against Selling Body 
Parts, 4 REP. CENTER PHIL. & PUB. POL. 9, 10 (1984);  Council of the Transplantation Soci-
ety, Commercialisation in Transplantation: The Problems and Some Guidelines for Prac-
tice, THE LANCET, Sept. 28, 1985, at 715, 716; Speech by Richard N. Fine to World Trans-
plant Congress 2006, July 19, 2006, http://dynamist.com/tfaie/Fine-transplant-speech.html 
(noting but rejecting the concern that “impoverished individuals will be exploited and/or 
coerced to donate part of their body” under an organ sales system); Radin, supra note 149, 
at 1910-11 (noting, though not endorsing, this argument as to sales of body parts); COHEN,
supra note 118, at 56-64 (discussing and criticizing this argument). 
173 Arthur J. Matas et al., Morbidity and Mortality After Living Kidney Donation, 
1999–2001: Survey of United States Transplant Centers, 3 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 830, 
831 (2003); Eric M. Johnson et al., Complications and Risks of Living Donor Nephrectomy,
64 TRANSPLANTATION 1124 (1997). 
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one who gives away that kidney loses the backup.174 The liver regrows, 
which is why part of a liver may be extracted from one person and 
transplanted into another with a full recovery expected for both; but 
there seems to have been about a 0.25% incidence of provider death,175 
plus some risk of nonfatal complications.176 A 1983 study reports that 
giving bone marrow led to life-threatening complications in 0.27% of re-
ported cases from 1970 to 1983, though all the complications were 
cleared up with no long-term harm to the donors.177 
It’s not clear to me that protecting organ sellers from these modest 
risks is reason enough to prohibit organ sales during a person’s life.178 
It is certainly enough to justify detailed counseling, waiting periods, and 
requirements that part of the price for the organ include insurance 
against removal-related medical problems.179 It may even justify bar-
ring donations by people who one thinks are likely to be unduly 
tempted, such as drug addicts (whose organs might not be useful in any 
event), or by people who are unusually vulnerable to complications from 
the surgery.  These regulations may slightly increase the cost of organs, 
but not enough to create a substantial burden on recipients’ self-defense 
rights. 
 
174 See Mary D. Ellison et al., Living Kidney Donors in Need of Kidney Transplants: A 
Report from Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 74 TRANSPLANTATION 1349 
(2002). 
175 See Charles Miller et al., Fulminant and Fatal Gas Gangrene of the Stomach in a 
Healthy Live Liver Donor, 10 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 1315 (2004) (noting ten donor 
deaths); Yasuhiko Sugawara & Masatosihi Makuuchi, Safe Liver Harvesting from Living 
Donors, 12 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 902 (2005) (reporting that by July 2005, 2734 live 
donor liver transplants had been performed in the U.S., and between 1990 and 2003, 1473 
live donor liver transplants had been performed in Europe). 
176 Shin Hwang, Lessons Learned from 1,000 Living Donor Liver Transplantations in 
a Single Center: How to Make Living Donations Safe, 12 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 920 
(2006) (reporting 6.7% donor major complication rate at one transplant center before 2001, 
reduced to 1.3% since 2002); Hani P. Grewal et al., Complications in 100 Living-Liver Do-
nors, 228 ANNALS OF SURGERY 214 (1998) (reporting 13% major complication rate in 1989-
96).  
177 M. M. Bortin & C. D. Buckner, Major Complications of Marrow Harvesting for 
Transplantation, 11 EXP. HEMATOL. 916 (1983). 
178 The matter may be different if an organ transplant involved a huge risk for the 
provider—but that’s flows from the magnitude of the risk, not its existence.  Thus, the hy-
pothetical in Thomas H. Murray, Organ Vendors, Families, and the Gift of Life, in ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES 101, 103-04 (Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 
1996), of a person’s being paid to participate in a lottery in which the “winners” would 
have “every usable part of their bodies . . . removed” for transplantation misses the point:  
This lottery guarantees death for organ providers; even without payment, and without 
such a hypothetical lottery, we wouldn’t cooperate with someone’s committing suicide with 
an eye towards donating his organs (except possibly when a parent sacrifices his life to 
save a child’s, though maybe not even then).  The problem isn’t payment but the certainty 
of many providers’ death.  See RONALD MUNSON, RAISING THE DEAD: ORGAN TRANS-
PLANTS, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 120 (2002).  The impropriety of any such lottery tells us 
nothing about the propriety of compensation for running a very small risk of death. 
179 See Hansmann, supra note 170, at 74. 
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But a broader prohibition, I think, would not be justified.  If some-
one believes that the prospect of making some tens of thousands of dol-
lars justifies a modest risk to his health, the government’s interest in 
protecting him against his being overtempted by the money shouldn’t 
suffice to trump the medical self-defense rights that I’ve discussed.  This 
is especially so if the money will be spent by the recipient to treat his 
own unrelated health condition, or to treat his children’s health prob-
lems—the sale of the organ might on balance improve his family’s ex-
pected health, rather than slightly jeopardizing it.180 
Yet even if I’m mistaken, recognizing that the organ sales ban limits 
an important human right should invalidate such a substantial burden 
if the government can prevent the harm through lighter burdens.  For 
instance, if we really think that $30,000 is an undue temptation to some 
people,181 we might exclude some providers who are competent but 
likely to be excessively tempted.  We might exclude, for instance, those 
who are adults but below 25, if we think they are likely to be too pre-
sent-centered and too likely to ignore the risk of death or bodily injury.  
We might exclude foreign providers from very poor countries, for whom 
$30,000 may be a lifetime’s worth of savings.182 
We might exclude parents of minor children, who we might think 
may feel socially pressured to risk their health for their children’s sakes.  
We might even exclude Americans who are very poor.  One would want 
the money to mean something to the provider; offering $30,000 for a 
somewhat risky procedure but only to multimillionaires wouldn’t be 
much of an incentive.  But perhaps we can conclude that people who 
make, say, at least $40,000 per year and are over 25 are likely to make a 
sensible judgment about whether to run a modest health risk for 
$30,000.  And there may well be enough such people to supply the medi-
cal self-defense needs of all Americans who are suffering from organ 
failure. 
Now some might balk at such limitations.  Aren’t 21-year-olds adult 
enough that we shouldn’t treat them as second-class citizens who are 
unable to make intelligent decisions?  Why should very poor people, or 
people who are trying to make a better life for their children, be denied 
a money-making opportunity that’s given to people of greater means—
and be denied this opportunity precisely because the money is especially 
 
180 See, e.g., MUNSON, supra note 178, at 117-19. 
181 See Crespi, supra note 36, at 44 (suggesting that $30,000 would be a plausible 
price for each major organ). 
182 This may also respond to the concern that “our international credibility would be 
dealt a severe blow by our tolerance of a plan according to which the poor in underdevel-
oped countries were exploited as a source of spare parts for rich Americans,” Gorovitz, su-
pra note 172, at 11, if one thought such concerns justify substantially burdening people’s 
self-defense rights, or if one thought a prohibition on imported organs wouldn’t substan-
tially burden those rights because enough such organs would be supplied in the U.S. once 
American organ providers start getting paid. 
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valuable (so valuable as to be unfairly pressuring) to the poor and to 
parents?183 
If such objections are right, though, they only illustrate the problem 
with a paternalistic system that interferes with recipients’ self-defense 
rights and with providers’ freedom of choice.  The response to these ob-
jections should be to give all adult, competent would-be organ providers 
the right to decide whether to sell their organs—as they now have the 
right to decide whether to give the organs away—and not to deny this 
ability to everyone. 
Still, if people are not persuaded, and think there’s always too much 
risk of undue pressure when living providers sell their organs—even 
when the transplant procedure is really quite safe, and complications 
quite unlikely—the solution should still not be a total ban.  At most, we 
should ban organ sales during the provider’s life, and allow them when 
the provider has just died. 
Cadaveric organ transplants tend to be less effective than living 
provider transplants,184 and there may not be enough transplant-eligible 
cadaveric organs available, since the organs of people who die when old 
or sick are generally considered unsuitable for transplantation.185 Such 
a restriction may therefore still substantially burden some recipients’ 
medical self-defense rights. 
But at least it would be a far lesser burden than a total ban on or-
gan sales, including on sales from cadavers, would be; and it would ac-
tually help serve the interest in protecting the health of living donors, 
because it would make living donations less necessary.186 If we are to 
 
183 See Radin, supra note 149, at 1910-11 (“If we think respect for persons warrants 
prohibiting a mother from selling something personal to obtain food for her starving chil-
dren, we do not respect her personhood more by forcing her to let them starve instead.”); 
Barnett et al., infra note 186, at 213. 
184 See, e.g., Arthur J. Matas et al., 2,500 Living Donor Kidney Transplants: A Single-
Center Experience, 234 ANNALS OF SURGERY 149, 161-62 (2001); Paul I. Terasaki et al., 
High Survival Rates of Kidney Transplants from Spousal and Living Unrelated Donors,
333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 333 (1995) (reporting over 80% survival rates for people who re-
ceived kidneys from living donors, and 70% for people who received kidneys from cadav-
ers); Medin, supra note 111, at 704 (reporting 94% survival rates over 5 years for people 
who received kidneys from living donors, and 76% for people who received kidneys from 
cadavers). 
185 About 13,000 eligible sets of cadaveric organs become available in the U.S. each 
year, and only about 6000 are donated each year.  See Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the 
Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United States, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667, 669 
(2003).  Up to 7000 extra sets of organs, which would include up to 14,000 kidneys, might 
thus become available each year, depending on how many people will be motivated by the 
payment to make available their own organs (posthumously) or to make available their 
relatives’ organs.   
186 See Andrew H. Barnett, Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Improving Organ 
Donation: Compensation Versus Markets, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, infra 
note 206, at 208, 210. 
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impose a burden, we should impose this lesser one rather than the much 
greater one.187 
5. Maintaining Organ Quality 
Some have argued that allowing organ sales would decrease the 
quality of organs available for transplants.188 Some of the people who 
will be most tempted to sell their organs, for instance, might be intrave-
nous drug users who are desperate for money yet more likely to be af-
flicted with certain diseases.189 This has been one reason why blood 
banks prefer to get blood from donors rather than from sellers.190 
Yet here again the solution is to institute more modest regulations, 
rather than a flat ban.  The diseases can generally be screened for 
(something that wasn’t so decades ago, when the concern about paid 
blood arose191), and would in any case have to be screened for, since even 
charitable donors of organs—alive or dead—may be sick.192 Blood 
banks, including German blood banks that routinely buy blood, operate 
 
187 Note that even under the current system, there’s pressure on people to donate or-
gans:  If your relative needs a kidney, you might feel strong family pressure to donate the 
kidney even if you don’t feel close to the relative, and wouldn’t want to donate but for the 
family pressure.  See Jeffrey P. Kahn, Would You Give a Stranger Your Kidney? The Eth-
ics of “Unknown” Kidney Donors,
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/bioethics/9807/stranger.kidney/ (“In practice, related donors 
who are an appropriate match often feel pressured to donate, and sometimes even request 
a ‘medical’ excuse from the transplant team so that they do not have to refuse to help a 
friend or loved one.”); MARK J. CHERRY, KIDNEY FOR SALE BY OWNER 5 (2005) (noting this 
possibility); Richard A. Epstein, The Sale of Organs for Transplants Should Be Legalized,
in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 62, 64 (2003) (likewise).  This isn’t identi-
cal to the pressure of an offered $30,000, but in many ways it might be more effective.  Al-
lowing sales of organs will diminish this pressure, and may largely eliminate it if enough 
organs will go on the market to satisfy demand; and allowing sales of cadaveric organs 
will diminish this social pressure on prospective living donors without creating financial 
pressure on such donors. 
188 See, e.g., Council of the Transplantation Society, supra note 172, at 716; Gorovitz, 
supra note 172, at 10; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN TISSUE: ETHICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES 51 (1995). 
189 Cf. Barnett et al., supra note 186, at 215 (noting the related problem that the 
prospect of compensation might tempt relatives of deceased drug users into concealing 
their drug use). 
190 See Ronald E. Domen, Paid-Versus-Volunteer Blood Donation in the United States: 
A Historical Review, IX TRANSFUSION MED. REVS. no. 1, Jan. 1995, at 53. 
191 See C.L. van der Poel, E. Seifried & W.P. Schaasberg, Paying for Blood Donations: 
Still a Risk?, 83 VOX SANGUINIS 285, 286 (2002). 
192 See Peters, supra note 125, at 1303.  Of course, “low quality” may be a matter of 
degree; many organs may offer recipients some chance of life, just much less than a “high-
quality” organ.  In such a situation, a patient who is nearly certain to die for want of an 
organ—so her choice is a low-quality organ or death—should have a medical self-defense 
right not to be legally blocked from using the best organ she can find.  But the government 
could identify the low-quality organs and protect patients from unwittingly getting such 
organs, or even prohibit patients from getting such organs if their chance of survival with-
out the organ (for instance, through dialysis) is greater than with the organ. 
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quite well doing this.193 Sperm banks and fertility clinics routinely buy 
sperm and ova.  The same approach should work for other human body 
products.  Moreover, if compensation generates more organs, doctors 
can improve average organ quality by being more selective about the or-
gans they need to use, and by setting aside organs that are not infected 
with serious disease but also not optimal for transplantation.194 
6. Promoting Altruism 
Paying for organs, the theory goes, will undermine the spirit of al-
truism that animates organ donation, and that organ donation in turn 
reinforces.  Allowing organ sales would thus, the argument goes, “have a 
social cost destructive of the common good”: 
It would sap the altruistic bonds that draw people together in solidarity 
and harmony.  Some of the best moral lessons presented by the modern 
media are stories of persons donating their own organs and those of de-
ceased loved ones to others who had been strangers but who now are 
bound to them and their families with a gratitude beyond expression.  
Human bonds of such profundity stand out against the background of 
an increasingly selfish and materialistic society.  True, in a commercial 
system no one would be denied the right to confer this monumental gift 
of life without charge, but probably fewer and fewer would have the 
impulse to do so, as self-interest thrives and altruism atrophies.195 
Let’s think through this theory, though.  Imagine that someone sug-
gested that other inputs into the transplant process—doctor time, hospi-
tal equipment, pharmaceutical company products—had to be provided 
for free, too, as a means of promoting altruism and the common good.  
Such a mandate that organ transplants involve no transfer of money ei-
ther to service and product providers or to organ providers, the argu-
ment would go, would “have a social benefit promoting the common 
good”: 
It would promote the altruistic bonds that draw people together in soli-
darity and harmony.  Some of the best moral lessons presented by the 
modern media will be stories of doctors donating their time to people 
who had been strangers but who now are bound to them and their fami-
lies with a gratitude beyond expression.  Human bonds of such profun-
dity stand out against the background of an increasingly selfish and 
materialistic society.  True, in a commercial system no one would be 
denied the right to confer this monumental gift of life without charge, 
but probably fewer and fewer doctors would have the impulse to do so, 
as self-interest thrives and altruism atrophies. 
Would we really support such an “organ transplant services dona-
tion” system, in which doctors were in the same position in which pro-
 
193 See, e.g., Paid Vs. Unpaid Donors, 90 VOX SANGUINIS 63, 66 (2006) (noting that 
German blood donors are paid from 20 to 25 euros for whole blood, and from 45 to 55 euros 
for plateletpheresis). 
194 See Barnett et al., supra note 186, at 215. 
195 Dougherty, supra note 148, at 55; COHEN, supra note 118, at 74-76 (discussing and 
criticizing a version of this argument). 
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viders now are?  I take it that we wouldn’t, for the simple reason that 
such a system would bring about the deaths of thousands of patients.  
Many doctors are altruistic, and do provide a good deal of free medical 
help.196 Some of them might perform charitable organ transplants, if 
compensation for the transplants were prohibited.  But we should ex-
pect that many fewer organ transplants would be provided—and many 
more sick people would die—if we were to rely on altruism rather than 
on self-interest.197 
More broadly, if I am right that banning organ sales interferes with 
an important human right (even a constitutional right) to self-defense, 
such an interference can’t be justified by a desire to provide “moral les-
sons” counteracting the perceived harms of “increasing[] selfish[ness] 
and materialis[m].”  We wouldn’t accept bans on payment for private 
education, even if the bans were justified on the grounds that free pri-
vate education (which some institutions, chiefly religious ones, might 
well provide) may foster “altruistic bonds” between teacher and student 
that provide extra “the best moral lessons.”  Such bans would unac-
ceptably interfere with parents’ constitutional right to educate their 
children.  Likewise, the desire to teach moral lessons can’t justify bans 
on payment for medical self-defense. 
7. Avoiding Alienation of Donors 
Some have also hypothesized a somewhat different altruism effect: 
that offering money for organs might alienate donors who would give 
the organs for free, and might therefore decrease (or not substantially 
increase) the aggregate donor supply.  One can imagine some such 
mechanisms:  If some people believe (whether rightly or wrongly) that 
an organ market is immoral or disgusting, they may refuse to partici-
pate.198 If some people start thinking of the transaction in financial 
terms, they may conclude that $30,000 is too low a price for parts of 
their bodies, even if they would have donated the body parts for free. 
Likewise, some people might be turned off from the loss of the emo-
tional benefit that accompanies a pure selfless act.199 Or some people 
might donate organs under the current system because they seek the 
emotional reward that comes from doing something that can only be 
done by the charitably minded.  Once organ provision becomes the sort 
of thing that is routinely done for money, they might no longer be inter-
ested in doing it. 
 
196 See supra note 123. 
197 Cf. Hansmann, supra note 170, at 78 (“If [considerations of promoting altruism] do 
not justify outlawing a commercial market in care of one’s elderly parents . . . then why 
should they justify outlawing sale of the rights to one’s organs, even after death?”). 
198 See Murray, supra note 178, at 118 (making this argument). 
199 See Hansmann, supra note 170, at 67-68 & n.23 (discussing this concern); R.M. 
TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP FROM HUMAN TO SOCIAL POLICY (1970) (likewise); NUF-
FIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supa note 188, at 51-52 (likewise). 
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Yet while one can imagine such reactions, my sense is that they’d be 
quite rare.  To begin with, only about 1.5% of all U.S. living donor trans-
plants—in 2005, 89 transplants in total—are purely unrelated anony-
mous donations.  Even if all these unrelated anonymous donors become 
alienated by the prospect that others are being compensated for provid-
ing organs, and aren’t mollified by the prospect of refusing compensa-
tion or donating the compensation to their favorite charity, this will be a 
very small loss to the organ pool.  The remaining 98.5% are either dona-
tions to relatives, targeted donations (presumably mostly to acquaintan-
ces), or “paired exchange” donations in which the recipient’s relative or 
acquaintance provides an organ in exchange to the donor’s relative or 
acquaintance.200 These donors, I suspect, will care primarily about the 
welfare of the transplant beneficiary, and won’t refuse to donate just be-
cause compensation is offered.  The cadaveric organs do often go to 
strangers.  But how likely is it a next-of-kin who would be willing to do-
nate the decedent’s organs under a pure donation system would instead 
refuse when offered money (even given the option of declining the 
money, or sending it to his favorite charity)? 
On the other hand, the opposite reaction—a financial incentive do-
ing what financial incentives usually do, which is stimulated the re-
warded conduct—should, I suspect, sway quite a few people.  We see 
some evidence of this in the supply of eggs to infertile couples:  In Amer-
ica, where women routinely get $5000 to $15,000 for such eggs, the eggs 
are generally available; in England, where the compensation is capped 
at £250,201 there is a years-long waiting list;202 in Australia, where pay-
ment for eggs is banned, there is a five-year-long list.203 We also see 
plenty of evidence of this in our daily experience with the overwhelming 
majority of other goods and services, where offering money will get you 
much better results than asking for charity.204 
200 See Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (category Transplant, organ All, report Living 
Donor Transplants by Donor Relation) (2005 data). 
201 Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., FAQs for Donors, http://www.hfea. 
gov.uk/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3F57D79B-696D45B3/hfea/hs.xsl/1205.html. 
202 David Derbyshire, I Went to a Spanish Clinic and Was Pregnant Within Months,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 3, 2004, at 9 (reporting a two-year waiting list); Nic Fleming, 
Payment of Pounds 1,000 To Ease Egg Donor Shortage, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2004, 
at 1 (reporting waiting lists for up to five years); Passport, Tickets, Suncream, Sperm . . .,
OBSERVER (U.K.), Jan. 15, 2006 (reporting a two-to-eight-year waiting list, though after an 
April 2005 ban on anonymous egg donation, which may have contributed to decreasing the 
availability of donated eggs). 
203 Nick Papps, Aussies Couples Buying Babies Made To Order, Sept. 5, 2004, at 2. 
204 One exception is sex:  Offering $10 to a stranger in a bar for sex will likely give 
you a worse result than trying to get the sex for free; even offering $500 will get you a 
worse result with most people, though success with some.  Yet this flows from matters pe-
culiar to sex:  Most people believe prostituting oneself is dishonorable; even those that 
don’t share this view might therefore fear ostracism if they engage in prostitution; for re-
lated reasons, being paid money for sex may deprive the sexual act of the erotic and emo-
tional pleasure that it might otherwise have; being paid money for sex largely forecloses 
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Moreover, the offer of money may easily be presented in ways that 
harness charitable people’s charitable attitudes.  Providing your (or 
your recently deceased relative’s) kidney for money, after all, saves a 
person’s life just as much as donating the kidney would;205 and then, if 
you have strong charitable impulses, you can just take that money and 
give it to your church, or your favorite charity.206 
The recipient is no worse off because you took the money.  (Under an 
organ market system, the cost of the organ would surely be paid by pri-
vate or government insurance, just as the much greater cost of the other 
inputs into the transplant—doctor time, hospital space, pharmaceuti-
cals and surgical supplies207—is now paid.)  And if you are charitably 
minded, you can just take the money and give it to your church, or your 
favorite charity, or if you prefer some fund that will support organ 
transplants for the poor.  You get to feel good about two things, the sav-
ing of a life and the donation of the proceeds, rather than just one. 
What’s more, many genuinely altruistic people understandably feel 
that their charity should begin at home.  A father’s death in an accident, 
which makes the organ donation possible, might at the same time strip 
away his wife’s and children’s main source of financial support.  Getting 
money for the organs and using it for the children’s benefit will likely 
seem far more appealing—even if the mother is generally charitably in-
clined—than just giving the organs away.208 
This leaves one sort of person who might still be turned off, despite 
the option of declining payment or routing the payment to his favorite 
cause: someone who is deeply attached to the concept of doing the sort of 
 
the possibility of viewing the sexual act as a potential (even if improbable) step to a more 
serious emotional relationship; because prostitutes usually have sex with very many part-
ners, prostitution is connected in people’s minds with disease, and this connection may de-
ter people from engaging even in one-time acts of prostitution; and an approach that re-
veals that the approacher patronizes prostitutes might suggest the approacher himself is 
diseased.  Little of this applies to the donation of organs. 
205 See COHEN, supra note 118, at 74-75.  
206 This helps illustrate why it’s a mistake to reason that a compensation system will 
“eliminate altruism from decisions to donate organs,” Edmund D. Pellegrino, Families’ 
Self-Interest and the Cadaver’s Organs: What Price Consent?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTS 205, 205 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho, eds. 1998), or “intrude vio-
lently on [an organ gift’s ability to convey a sense of sympathy, to provide consolation to 
the decedent’s family, or to honor the decedent’s own generosity] and on the meaning of 
the relationship between the family and the newly dead person,” Murray, supra note 178, 
at 117-18.  The family remains free to donate the organ and not accept money from it, or 
to provide the organ and altruistically donate the revenue to the charitable cause that 
they most support. 
207 See Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (Vendor) Kid-
neys: A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216, 218 (2003).. 
208 Cf. Peters, supra note 125, at 1303 (arguing that it is unfair to impose the pro-
altruism-towards-strangers views of medical professionals who “are educated, well paid, 
and generally able to manage circumstances to the benefit of [them]selves and others”—
and who are actually “mak[ing] money [them]selves” from the transplant operation—on 
next-of-kin who don’t share such values).  
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thing that cannot be done for compensation.209 Note that this person 
isn’t the hyper-altruist who just wants to provide an organ to save a 
stranger’s life; he can still do that if he gets paid.  Nor is it the hyper-
altruist who just wants to give the organ free; he can still do that by for-
going compensation.  Rather, it’s someone who won’t want to save the 
stranger’s life if such lifesaving is also done by others for compensation. 
Yet how common are such people likely to be, compared to those 
who will see an offer of payment as an incentive?  Consider the thought 
experiment from the last section:  Imagine a requirement that doctors 
who do organ transplants do them for free, or not at all.  Do we expect 
that such a requirement would on balance increase the number of doc-
tors willing to perform such operations, since some doctors will be 
thrilled to do something that can only be done by the charitably 
minded?  Would we say, “Sure, some doctors won’t want to invest their 
time and effort with no compensation, but think of how many more doc-
tors would want to perform such a public service”?  Or would we expect 
that counting on a combination of incentives and conventional altruism 
(in which some doctors may contribute their time and effort while forgo-
ing compensation210) is a much surer bet than counting on pure altruism 
alone? 
8. Saving Money for the Government / Insurers / Policyholders 
Paying for organs will by definition increase the cost of organs.  At 
the same time, it will save the cost of alternative care, such as kidney 
dialysis—on balance, it seems likely that this savings would be nearly 
$100,000,211 more than enough to offset the organ cost.  In those situa-
tions, then, the saving money argument can’t justify the limitation on 
medical self-defense rights. 
But even if, for certain organs, paying for the organs ends up mean-
ing more expense,212 and mandating that organs be provided for free 
(which means they often won’t be provided at all) will save money for 
the government and for policyholders, that’s a poor justification for in-
terfering with someone’s self-defense rights.  Even if we were to find 
that people’s lethal self-defense on balance increases costs to the 
state,213 I take it that we wouldn’t allow this as a justification for ban-
ning such self-defense.  Likewise, even if the government chooses not to 
fund certain expensive medical procedures, I take it that it couldn’t ban 
 
209 Thanks to Judy Daar for raising this issue with me. 
210 See supra note 123. 
211 See Matas & Schnitzler, supra note 207, at 218. 
212 See Hansmann, supra note 170, at 79 (noting this possibility, though not endorsing 
a ban on organ sales as a justification). 
213 For instance, if injuries to attackers who are hurt but not killed by victims’ self-
defense are more expensive to treat than injuries that the victims are averting, or if the 
attackers are more likely to be indigent and to require taxpayer-funded treatment while 
the victims are more likely to have private insurance. 
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private payment for those procedures on the theory that the ban would 
decrease overall medical insurance costs. 
Such restrictions would save the government, or policyholders, cash, 
but only at the expense of denying individuals their lives, and the abil-
ity to defend their lives, something that is much more valuable to them 
and on balance more valuable to society.  While some recipients—those 
who are lucky enough to get their organs for free under the current sys-
tem—may end up paying more (sometimes out of pocket, more often 
through insurance) if organs have to be paid for, other recipients would 
get something much more valuable: their lives. 
If we are to look at the aggregate benefit to all recipients, or to any 
particular person’s preferences as determined behind the veil of igno-
rance, allowing organ sales is the far less costly solution.214 And while 
sometimes aggregate social benefit may trump individual rights, surely 
when individual rights claims point in the same direction as aggregate 
social benefit, the government ought not be able to override the rights 
simply to save money for Medicare or even for health insurance policy-
holders generally. 
VI. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY 
I hope I’ve provided a sound precedential and ethical argument for 
recognizing a presumptive constitutional and moral right of medical 
self-defense, and for applying it to experimental treatments and to 
payment for organ transplants.  Yet will the mostly conservative Su-
preme Court, or for that matter many voters or legislators, be receptive 
to such a right? 
I surely can’t predict that the answer is “yes.”  Perhaps the odds are 
against it.  Yet it seems premature to answer “no.” 
Notwithstanding the Court’s frequent rumblings of hostility to “ac-
tivism” and to recognition of unenumerated rights, abortion rights still 
stand.215 Unenumerated parental rights still stand.216 Justice Scalia’s 
argument for the rejection of parental rights got only his vote (though 
with a suggestion by Justice Thomas that the matter should still be 
seen as open).217 
A right to sexual autonomy has for the first time been recognized, 
with Justice Kennedy joining the liberals.218 One of the two judges who 
voted for the Abigail Alliance decision was Douglas Ginsburg, whom 
Ronald Reagan had nominated for the Supreme Court seat that ulti-
mately went to Justice Kennedy.  The legal effort in Abigail Alliance 
was spearheaded by the Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative 
 
214 See Crespi, supra note 36, at 52. 
215 Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
216 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
217 Id. at 80, 91. 
218 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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public interest firm that has on its Legal Policy Advisory Board conser-
vatives like Dick Thornburgh, Ted Olson, and Ken Starr.219 Justice 
Scalia himself suggested that there might be an unenumerated right to 
lethal self-defense;220 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy 
and Thomas signed on to that opinion.221 Seventh Circuit Judge Ken-
neth Ripple, a Reagan appointee, took the view that there is a constitu-
tional right to self-defense even in prison;222 Reagan appointee Joel 
Flaum and George H.W. Bush appointee Ilana Rovner joined Judge 
Ripple in voting to rehear the case en banc.223 
The right to lethal self-defense is popular among conservatives (and 
is largely accepted, though with some reservations, by most liberals).  
The right to abortion-as-self-defense is popular among liberals (and is 
largely accepted, though with some reservations, by most conserva-
tives).  If the analogies I draw between these rights and a broader medi-
cal self-defense right are apt, then they offer the hope for a substantial 
coalition that will accept such a right. 
More broadly, a dozen years of Court-watching have taught me the 
fallibility of my predictions that “Surely the Justices won’t do that.”  
When United States v. Lopez was pending, many people (including me) 
were confident that the Court would handily reject the argument that 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was outside Congress’s enumerated 
powers.224 When City of Boerne v. Flores was pending, many people (in-
cluding me) predicted that the Court would reject the challenge to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s constitutionality.225 
Even when the Court had started reading the Jury Trial Clause as a 
limitation on the government’s power to impose rule-bound sentencing 
factors to be found by a judge, many people (including me) thought that 
the Court probably wouldn’t strike down the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines, which it had after all upheld against many other constitutional 
challenges, and which had been the mainstay of federal criminal prac-
tice for over a decade.226 Each time, we were proven wrong. 
 
219 See http://www.wlf.org/Resources/Partners/legalpolicy.asp. 
220 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (plurality) (dictum) (suggesting that 
“the historical record may support” the proposition that “the right to have a jury consider 
self-defense evidence . . . is fundamental”). 
221 Id. 
222 Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1054-56 (7th Cir. 1993) (Ripple, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that even prisoners have a constitutional right to self-defense). 
223 Id. at 1047 n.**. 
224 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal 
Courts, 574 ANNALS 132, 133 (2001) (“Court watchers were surprised, even shocked, when, 
in 1995, United States v. Lopez struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act”). 
225 See Eugene Volokh, Hats off to Abner Greene, post to the RELIGIONLAW discus-
sion list, June 23, 1997, http://lists.ucla.edu/pipermail/religionlaw/1997-June/008800.html 
(reporting that of the 22 law professors on the RELIGIONLAW list who made predictions 
about Bonere, including some of the leading Religion Clauses scholars in the country, 17 
guessed wrong). 
226 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Principle Versus Pragmatism, Sentencing Law & 
Policy, Aug. 19, 2004, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/08/ 
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Some arguments may be so far-fetched, or may have been so roundly 
rejected, or may be so repugnant to most Justices’ deeply held jurispru-
dential or philosophical commitments that the arguments can confi-
dently be predicted to be losers.  But it seems to me that the constitu-
tional arguments articulated in this article fall into none of these cate-
gories.  And in any event, I hope the moral arguments will be persuasive 
even to those who hesitate to see the matter constitutionalized. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The debate over experimental drug therapies for the terminally ill, 
or market-based solutions to the organ shortage, isn’t just a matter of 
public health or even saving lives.  It’s also a matter, I have argued, of a 
constitutional and moral right—the right to self-defense. 
Abortion rights supporters have long defended the abortion-as-self-
defense aspect of that right, and even many who are not zealous about 
abortion rights have agreed as to that particular aspect.  Gun rights 
supporters have long stressed the lethal self-defense aspect of that 
right, and even many who are not zealous about gun rights have agreed 
that lethal self-defense ought to be allowed even if guns are heavily 
regulated or banned. 
I have argued that those who support self-defense in those contexts 
should equally support it when it comes to general medical self-defense.  
I hope this framing of the problem can help promote a broad left, right, 
and center coalition in support of self-defense rights: a coalition that 
recognizes one of the most basic human rights, the right of those in peril 
of life to use their property and the help of others—doctors, pharmaceu-
tical companies, willing organ providers—to defend themselves, whether 
against threats posed by criminals, animals, fetuses, cancer, or organ 
failure. 
 
principle_versu.html (quoting Prof. Ron Wright as saying that “Various staff members of 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission now believe that it is most likely the Supreme Court will 
uphold the guidelines”). 
